Adams v. Commission on Appellate Court Appointments, 254 P.3d 367

The Arizona Constitution requires a five-member Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) to draw boundaries after every decennial census, with eligibility and nonpartisan rules governing appointment.
The Appointment Commission must nominate 25 persons to the IRC, including ten from each of the two largest parties and five unaffiliated; the House Speaker then appoints one from the list, followed by the next three leaders, and the four appointees select the fifth, who must be from an unrepresented party.
In 2010 the Commission selected 25 nominees including Bender (independent/tribal judge), Schnepf (Republican irrigation district director), and Sossaman (Republican irrigation district director).
House Speaker Adams and Senate President Pearce objected, arguing the three were ineligible due to holding public office; the Commission declined to amend its list.
The Petitioners sought relief asserting the three nominees were ineligible under Article 4, Part 2, § 1(3) of the Arizona Constitution, which bars “any other public office” within three years prior to appointment; the case was brought as a special action to challenge the nominee pool.
The Court granted relief in part, concluding Schnepf and Sossaman are ineligible because irrigation district directors are public officers, while Bender remains eligible because tribal judge status is not a public office under § 1(3).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether irrigation district directors qualify as "public office" under § 1(3).	Schnepf and Sossaman hold public office as irrigation district directors.	Irrigation districts are political subdivisions; their officers are not public offices under § 1(3).	Schnepf and Sossaman ineligible.
Whether a tribal judge holds a "public office" under § 1(3).	Bender’s tribal judge positions are public offices of sovereign tribes.	Tribal offices are not state/public offices; tribes are sovereign entities.	Bender eligible; tribal judges not public offices under § 1(3).
How broadly to interpret "any other public office" in § 1(3) relative to tribal and federal offices.	The term should be read broadly to include tribal offices.	The term should not sweep tribal offices; context limits it.	Court construes § 1(3) to broadly include tribal offices; majority does not extend to tribal offices; dissent would include them.

Brewer v. Burns, 222 Ariz. 234 (2009) (standards for standing to challenge appointment)
State ex rel. Pickrell v. Senner, 92 Ariz. 243 (1962) (federal vs. state office distinctions)
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (federal office qualifications cannot be added by state law)
Steeves v. Wilson, 14 Ariz. 288 (1912) (liberal constitutional construction guidance)
Winsor v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 504 (1926) (definition/identity test for public office in context)
Stockton v. McFarland, 56 Ariz. 138 (1940) (predecessor interpretations of eligibility clauses)
State Consol. Publ’g Co. v. Hill, 39 Ariz. 21 (1931) (interpretation of public office terms in state law)