Adams v. Bell Partners, Inc.
138 So. 3d 1054
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- Plaintiffs Adams and Jacques were injured when a rental car paid for by Bell Partners and rented by employee Rosalyn Watson was driven by her husband, Anthony Watson, who caused the collision.
- Bell Partners reimbursed or directly paid for business rentals; Watson ordinarily rented through Hertz using a company credit card and was told not to buy additional rental insurance.
- The Hertz contract listed both Rosalyn and Anthony Watson as authorized drivers; Rosalyn testified supervisors had previously acquiesced to her husband driving company-paid rentals on at least two occasions and she received no discipline after the accident.
- Bell Partners had a written travel policy (2009/2010) prohibiting personal use of company rentals and forbidding non-employee drivers (spouse/family) under the company rental plan.
- At summary judgment Bell Partners argued it lacked vicarious liability because it did not consent to the husband driving, the husband’s use was unauthorized (conversion/theft), and, in a supplemental memorandum filed three days before the hearing, argued it lacked any property interest or control over the vehicle.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Bell Partners; the appellate court reversed, finding genuine factual disputes about bailment/bailee status and conversion and procedural error in considering the late-raised grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bell Partners can be vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine / as a bailee | Bell Partners paid for and benefitted from the rental and therefore can be a bailee and liable for negligent use | No ownership/lease/bailment; lacked property interest or control; no consent for husband to drive | Reversed: whether Bell was a bailee is a fact issue for the jury; summary judgment improper |
| Whether the husband’s unauthorized driving constituted conversion/theft relieving Bell of liability | Plaintiffs: factual dispute whether use was authorized or acquiesced by supervisors; conversion not established as a matter of law | Defendant: argues husband’s use was unauthorized conversion, relieving vicarious liability | Reversed: conversion is a disputed fact; jury must decide |
| Whether the trial court properly relied on new grounds raised in a supplemental memo filed 3 days before the hearing | Plaintiffs: supplemental grounds were untimely under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c) and cannot support summary judgment | Defendant: raised new theories of no property interest/control in supplemental memo | Reversed: court erred to grant judgment on untimely new grounds; violation of rule 1.510(c) |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate generally | Plaintiffs: conflicting evidence and inferences require a jury (policy vs. supervisor acquiescence; Hertz contract listing authorized drivers) | Defendant: moved for summary judgment alleging lack of consent/unauthorized use and later lack of property/control | Reversed: genuine issues of material fact exist; summary judgment improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60 (Fla. 2000) (explains Florida dangerous instrumentality doctrine and that bailee status is a fact-based inquiry)
- Brown v. Goldberg, Rubenstein & Buckley, P.A., 455 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (paying for a rental may create a bailment; bailee status is for the jury)
- Tribbitt v. Crown Contractors, Inc., 513 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (unauthorized use/conversion is a factual question that can preclude summary judgment)
- Orange Lake Country Club, Inc. v. Levin, 645 So.2d 60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (raising new grounds for summary judgment shortly before hearing violates rule 1.510(c) and cannot support judgment)