Adams, Randy Dale
PD-0969-17
| Tex. App. | Oct 6, 2017Background
- On July 10, 2014, Irving police requested and the Motel 6 front desk voluntarily handed over the motel guest registry to uniformed officers without any individualized suspicion.
- Officers checked the registry entries against warrants and discovered that Randy Dale Adams was a guest and had outstanding misdemeanor warrants.
- Officers located Adams, obtained consent to search his room, and found methamphetamine; Adams was charged with possession of a controlled substance.
- Adams moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the suspicionless review of the hotel registry violated Fourth Amendment protections; the trial court granted the motion.
- The State appealed pursuant to Texas Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(a)(5); the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed, holding Adams had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the registration under the third‑party doctrine.
- Appellee filed a Petition for Discretionary Review to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals raising (1) whether hotel registry privacy claims present a novel issue; (2) conflict with U.S. Supreme Court precedent; and (3) jurisdictional defect in the State’s notice of appeal (signature issue).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a hotel guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in motel registration records | Adams: a guest retains a privacy interest in registration information; the third‑party doctrine should not permit suspicionless fishing of sensitive records | State: registration information is voluntarily disclosed to a third party (motel) and is thus not protected under the third‑party doctrine | Court of Appeals: held no reasonable expectation of privacy; registry subject to third‑party doctrine, trial court abused discretion in suppressing evidence |
| Whether the third‑party doctrine applies to suspicionless, non‑targeted requests for registries | Adams: doctrine should be limited where sensitive information is obtained without any individualized suspicion | State: doctrine applies broadly to information shared with third parties | Court of Appeals: applied third‑party doctrine without imposing a suspicion requirement |
| Whether City of Los Angeles v. Patel and related Supreme Court concerns about registries affect this case | Adams: Patel signals constitutional concerns with suspicionless registry searches and supports review | State: distinguishes Patel or finds it inapplicable | Court of Appeals: did not rely on Patel; upheld third‑party doctrine as controlling |
| Whether the State’s notice of appeal was procedurally defective for lack of the elected DA’s signature | Adams: notice was invalid because the elected DA did not personally sign or explicitly authorize the First Assistant to sign; thus appellate jurisdiction is lacking | State: relied on notice as filed by First Assistant to invoke appeal | Court of Appeals: proceeded to decision; Adams asserts this departure warrants supervisory review by Court of Criminal Appeals |
Key Cases Cited
- 135 S. Ct. 2443 (City of Los Angeles v. Patel) (discusses constitutional problems with suspicionless on‑demand hotel registry inspections)
- 442 U.S. 735 (Smith v. Maryland) (establishes third‑party doctrine for information conveyed to third parties)
- 425 U.S. 435 (United States v. Miller) (holds business records held by third parties are not protected by the Fourth Amendment)
- 389 U.S. 347 (Katz v. United States) (articulates expectation of privacy test under the Fourth Amendment)
- 132 S. Ct. 945 (United States v. Jones) (concurrences raise concerns about third‑party doctrine in the digital age)
- 517 S.W.3d 112 (Hankston v. State) (Texas Crim. App. application of third‑party doctrine to CSLI and expectation‑of‑privacy analysis)
- 477 S.W.3d 321 (Ford v. State) (Texas Crim. App. discussion of third‑party doctrine in the context of location information)
- 829 S.W.2d 805 (State v. Muller) (procedural requirements for state notices of appeal and signature rules)
- 830 S.W.2d 605 (State v. Shelton) (further discussion of signature/authorization requirements for appeals by state prosecutors)
