Adamov v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n
776 F. Supp. 2d 447
W.D. Ky.2011Background
- Adamov, employed by U.S. Bank for over ten years, held VP/District Manager in Louisville since 2004.
- Hartnack became Head of Consumer Banking in 2005 and allegedly disparaged Adamov’s Russian national origin.
- Adamov alleges promotion denials and disparaging remarks tied to his national origin; he is a US citizen born in Russia with an accent.
- Discharge followed an alleged personal loan in 2007, said to be pretext for discriminatory termination and retaliation.
- EEOC right-to-sue letter issued; adamov alleges discrimination under KCRA and Title VII, with exhaustion issues noted by court.
- Court dismisses several claims for lack of standing/exhaustion and identifies a remaining discriminatory discharge claim against U.S. Bank.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saloutos’ liability for discrimination/retaliation | Saloutos participated in promotion denials due to national origin. | Saloutos was not adequately pleaded as a proper defendant; no viable factual basis. | Saloutos claim dismissed for failure to plead plausibly. |
| Hartnack's individual liability for discrimination/retaliation | Hartnack personally liable for discriminatory acts and retaliation. | Individual liability for discrimination under Title VII/KCRA is unavailable; retaliation not alleged against Hartnack. | Individual claims against Hartnack dismissed; no retaliation alleged. |
| Exhaustion of administrative remedies for Bank claims | Discrimination and retaliation claims exhausted via EEOC charge. | Exhaustion lacking for promotion denial and retaliation; only discharge claim exhausted. | Only discriminatory discharge claim exhausted; other claims dismissed for lack of exhaustion. |
| Preemption of state law KCRA claim by National Bank Act | KCRA claim arising from discriminatory discharge should proceed. | KCRA preempted by National Bank Act; preemption bars the state-law claim. | KCRA claim preempted; preemption acknowledged, leaving discriminatory discharge as remaining claim. |
| Golod-based dismissal standard applicability | Golod I/Foley-style reasoning does not apply due to direct evidence of discrimination. | Golod I controls due to lack of comparator evidence. | Golod rationale not controlling; court finds sufficient direct evidence to deny dismissal of discriminatory discharge claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard for federal claims)
- Wilkerson v. New Media Technology Charter School Inc., 522 F.3d 315 (3d Cir.2008) (Twombly pleading standard applies to employment discrimination claims)
- Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359 (6th Cir.2010) (exhaustion requirement for Title VII; need for properly exhausted claims)
- Golod v. Bank of America Corp., 403 Fed.Appx. 699 (3d Cir.2010) (direct-evidence-based discrimination claim not necessarily require comparator; Golod II affirmed)
- Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir.1997) (individual liability under Title VII generally not available unless employer status applies)
- Randolph v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724 (6th Cir.2006) (liberal construction of pro se charges; claims reasonably related may be considered)