259 So. 3d 701
Fla.2018Background
- On Jan 22, 2011, Shepard drove his car into the victim after an earlier bar altercation; the victim later died of head injuries. Shepard was convicted of manslaughter with a weapon (the car) and leaving the scene.
- Trial court reclassified manslaughter from second- to first-degree under §775.087(1) based on use of a "weapon" and sentenced Shepard to the maximum for a first-degree felony.
- On appeal the First DCA affirmed, holding an automobile can be a "weapon" under the reclassification statute; it certified conflict with the Second DCA in Gonzalez.
- The Florida Supreme Court reviewed whether an automobile may be a "weapon" for purposes of §775.087(1) and whether that determination is for the court or the jury.
- The Court overruled (in part) its prior reasoning in State v. Houck and held the statutory term "weapon" includes objects used or intended to be used to inflict harm; typically the jury decides whether an object was used as a weapon.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Shepard) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an automobile qualifies as a "weapon" under §775.087(1) | A car is not a "weapon" as commonly understood; Houck requires objects be commonly recognized for combat | A vehicle can be a weapon if used to inflict harm; "weapon" should follow ordinary meaning | An automobile can be a "weapon" if used or intended to be used to inflict harm; Houck's narrow "commonly recognized for combat" rule receded |
| Who determines whether an object is a weapon — judge or jury? | Court should determine as a matter of law (per Houck) | Jury typically resolves factual question whether defendant used object as a weapon | Whether an object was used as a weapon is typically a jury question of fact |
| Proper definitional approach to "weapon" in §775.087(1) | Adopt a narrow definition requiring intent to use the object as a weapon; apply canons (ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis) and rule of lenity | Use plain/ordinary meaning; include objects not designed as weapons when used as such | Adopt plain/ordinary meaning: any object used or intended to be used to inflict harm; court recedes from Houck’s restrictive test; rule of lenity not controlling here |
| Effect on reclassification statute scope | Narrow construction protects defendants from automatic reclassification absent intent | Broader construction deters weaponized methods and aligns with common-law treatment of objects as weapons | Reclassification may apply more broadly when an object (including a car) is used as a weapon; intent/factual usage is for jury to decide |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Houck, 652 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1995) (prior rule limiting “weapon” to instruments commonly recognized for combat; court previously treated determination as matter of law)
- Shepard v. State, 227 So.3d 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (First DCA held automobile can be a weapon and certified conflict)
- Gonzalez v. State, 197 So.3d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (Second DCA held automobile not a weapon under §775.087(1))
- Williamson v. State, 111 So. 124 (Fla. 1926) (historical recognition that an automobile may be considered a weapon when used to injure)
- Dale v. State, 703 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1997) (approving jury instruction defining "weapon" as any object that could cause death or serious bodily harm)
- United States v. Barnes, 569 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1978) (federal authority recognizing broad concept that almost any implement can be a weapon when used so)