Adam Keith Waldman v. Alabama Prison Commissioner
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18547
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Adam Waldman, an Alabama prisoner convicted in 2005 of first-degree robbery, attempted assault, and first-degree kidnapping of a minor (no sexual contact alleged), was later classified by ADOC as a sex offender and given an “S” suffix.
- Alabama law (since at least 1998) classifies first- and second-degree kidnapping of a minor as a “sex offense”; ASORCNA (enacted 2011) and its predecessor impose registration, residency, employment, and travel reporting restrictions and deny parole eligibility for persons convicted of listed sex offenses.
- ADOC’s classification manual (implemented under ASORCNA) makes "S" inmates ineligible for minimum custody, work release, and requires notice before classification changes; Waldman alleges he was reclassified in 2013 without required notice and forced into sex-offender programming.
- Waldman sued five ADOC officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (individual and official capacities) claiming violations of procedural due process, substantive due process, and the Ex Post Facto Clause; he sought damages and removal of the “S” designation.
- The District Court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural due process re: classification | Waldman: reclassification without notice/hearing violated liberty interest | Defendants: classification consistent with Alabama law; no protected liberty interest post-conviction | Held: No procedural due process violation—Waldman was convicted of an offense already classified as a sex offense, so no additional process was required; notice-procedure challenge is a state-law claim barred by Eleventh Amendment; post-release claims not ripe |
| Substantive due process re: classification/conditions | Waldman: classification and resulting conditions (programming, custody restrictions) are arbitrary and infringe fundamental rights | Defendants: no fundamental right implicated; measures further child-protection goals and are not conscience-shocking | Held: No substantive due process violation—no fundamental right; conditions do not shock the conscience and are rationally related to nonpunitive objectives |
| Ex Post Facto re: parole ineligibility and confinement conditions | Waldman: reclassification and ASORCNA increased punishment retroactively (parole loss, harsher confinement) | Defendants: Ex post facto applies only to punitive criminal laws; ASORCNA is civil/regulatory; named defendants cannot alter parole rules | Held: No ex post facto violation pleaded—post-release claims not ripe; plaintiff lacks standing re: parole because wrong defendants; confinement conditions bear rational connection to civil purpose so not punitive |
| Eleventh Amendment/state-law notice claim | Waldman: ADOC failed to follow manual’s notice provision, violating his rights | Defendants: state-law claim cannot be adjudicated in federal court against state officials in their official capacity | Held: State-law notice claim barred by Eleventh Amendment; federal court lacks jurisdiction over that pendent claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (inmate never convicted of a sex crime entitled to due process before sex-offender classification)
- United States v. Veal, 322 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (conviction for an offense classified as a sex crime at time of conviction defeats Kirby-based due-process claim)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (state sex-offender registry held civil; "clearest proof" required to show punitive intent)
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (federal courts cannot adjudicate state-law claims against state officials in federal forum)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury-in-fact causation and redressability)
- Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (liberty interest analysis for prisoner conditions: "atypical and significant hardship")
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (substantive due process: "shocks the conscience" standard)
- McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (substantive due process protects fundamental rights)
- Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (sex-offender registration/publication does not implicate a fundamental right)
- Tinker v. Beasley, 429 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2005) (examples of conscience-shocking conduct)