Adam Horton v. State of Indiana, 51 N.E.3d 1154

On Dec. 4, 2013, Adam Horton assaulted his girlfriend; he was charged with misdemeanors and felonies including a D‑felony domestic battery elevated based on a prior domestic battery conviction.
The trial was bifurcated: the jury tried the misdemeanor domestic battery count first; the jury convicted Horton of the misdemeanor but acquitted on strangulation counts.
With jurors still present, Horton’s counsel told the court he waived a jury for the D‑felony phase and requested a bench trial; Horton did not personally communicate waiver.
The court proceeded to a bench trial on the D‑felony count, took judicial notice of the court’s prior-case file (CM‑195) proving a prior domestic battery conviction, but did not formally enter those documents into the record.
The trial court later convicted Horton of D‑felony domestic battery and sentenced him; Horton appealed, raising (1) invalid jury‑trial waiver and (2) insufficient evidence because the prior sentencing order was unsigned and the noticed file was not in the record.

Issue	Horton’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Whether Horton validly waived his Indiana constitutional right to a jury trial for the D‑felony count	No — Horton did not personally communicate waiver; counsel’s statement is insufficient	Yes — an exception should be allowed where defendant just completed a jury trial and counsel waived on his behalf	Reversed: personal, on‑the‑record waiver by the defendant is required for felony jury‑waiver; counsel’s silence/waiver is insufficient
Whether evidence was sufficient to prove the prior conviction when the sentencing order was unsigned and the judicially noticed prior case file was not entered into the record	No — unsigned order and absence of admitted documents made proof inadequate	Yes — the court properly took judicial notice of its own public file and Horton raised no objection; the court records sufficiently identified the prior conviction	Affirmed (on sufficiency): judicial notice of an unambiguously identified public court file may suffice; best practice is to enter the specific documents into the record, but failure to do so here was not reversible error

Kellems v. State, 849 N.E.2d 1110 (Ind. 2006) (reaffirming requirement that defendant personally communicate jury‑waiver in felony cases)
Good v. State, 366 N.E.2d 1169 (Ind. 1977) (holding statutory waiver procedure requires defendant’s personal assent)
Perkins v. State, 541 N.E.2d 927 (Ind. 1989) (describing standard for knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver under state constitution)
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (Sixth Amendment jury waiver must be express and intelligent)
Graham v. State, 947 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that taking judicial notice of other court records without including them in the record impedes appellate review)
Brown v. Jones, 804 N.E.2d 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (court records are generally proper subjects of judicial notice absent evidence rebutting accuracy)
Doughty v. State, 470 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. 1984) (requiring waiver by defendant personally, reflected in the record before trial begins)