ADAM G. WEEKS v. JOHN THURSTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE; jUDY MILLER; CARA BRYANT, KEITH DECLERK, AND CAROLYN TOWELL, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS COMISSIONERS OF THE RANDOLPH COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION; MICHAEL BRADLEY, JUDY VERKLER, AND TOMMY HOLLAND, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS COMMISSIONERS OF THE LAWRENCE COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION; LOU ANN CUSHMAN, HOLLY MCLARAN, AND HOMER WILES, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS COMMISSIONERS OF THE SHARP COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION; And DAVID DICKSON, ALICE JAMES, AND DONNA GOULD, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS COMMISSIONERS OF THE JACKSON COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, 2020 Ark. 64

Adam G. Weeks, a sitting district judge, filed as a nonpartisan candidate for Third Judicial District, Division Three, Circuit Judge for the March 3, 2020 election.
Judy Miller petitioned to disqualify Weeks from the ballot, citing four misdemeanor hot-check convictions and one misdemeanor conviction for improper use of registration ("fictitious tags"), § 27-14-306.
The Pulaski County Circuit Court held the hot-check offenses did not disqualify Weeks but concluded the fictitious-tag misdemeanor did, relying on Fronterhouse v. State and removing Weeks from the ballot. The court declined to consider the surrounding circumstances of the 1994 offense.
The central legal question was whether § 27-14-306 is a misdemeanor that, under Ark. Const. art. 5 § 9, requires a finder of fact to find (or the defendant to admit) deceit, fraud, or false statement such that the conviction is an "infamous crime" disqualifying the candidate.
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding § 27-14-306 does not necessarily require a finding or admission of deceit/fraud/false statement; Weeks’s name must remain on the ballot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a conviction under Ark. Code § 27-14-306 is an "infamous crime" under Ark. Const. art. 5 § 9 (i.e., requires finding/admission of deceit, fraud, or false statement).	§ 27-14-306 inherently involves dishonesty and thus qualifies as an infamous crime.	The statute does not contain deceit/fraud/false-statement elements and can be violated without dishonest intent; therefore it is not necessarily infamous.	Reversed: § 27-14-306 does not require a finding or admission of deceit/fraud/false statement; conviction under it is not categorically an "infamous crime." Weeks remains on the ballot.
Whether courts may consider the attendant circumstances of a conviction when determining infamous-crime status under art. 5 § 9.	(Implicit) The fact of conviction may suffice; prior authorities treated circumstances as showing deceit.	Weeks argued circumstances should be considered to determine whether deceit was present.	The majority rejected Weeks’s contention that courts may rely on attendant circumstances to convert a conviction into an infamous crime; the analysis instead rests on the statutory elements.

Fronterhouse v. State, 463 S.W.3d 312 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015) (court of appeals had held § 27-14-306 convictions involve dishonesty by definition).
Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n v. Thompson, 16 S.W.3d 212 (2000) (judge’s use of fictitious tag found to be used to mislead law enforcement; disciplinary removal considered misconduct).
State v. Britt, 244 S.W.3d 665 (2006) (standards for statutory interpretation; penal statutes strictly construed in favor of defendant).
City of Jacksonville v. Smith, 540 S.W.3d 661 (2018) (holding a misdemeanor false-report conviction qualified as an "infamous crime" involving deceit).
State v. Cassell, 427 S.W.3d 663 (2013) (explaining that the fact of conviction, under the Constitution, is the disqualifying event).