Adam Correia v. John Bettencourt v. James Martitz
162 A.3d 630
| R.I. | 2017Background
- On August 7, 2011, three adults (including plaintiff Adam Correia and Edward Alexander) brought firearms onto and were target shooting on land owned by John and Theresa Bettencourt; a handgun accidentally discharged and struck Correia.
- Correia sued Alexander (negligence) and the Bettencourts asserting multiple theories against the landowners: control under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 318, premises liability, common-law negligence (Banks ad hoc analysis), and failure to supervise.
- The Bettencourts moved for summary judgment, arguing no duty existed because they were not present or informed of the shooting and thus had no opportunity to control Alexander.
- Correia claimed the Bettencourts leased part of the property to Alexander, knew he and his friends used the property for shooting, and therefore had knowledge and the ability to control the activity; he argued knowledge/control are factual issues for trial.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the Bettencourts, concluding presence (or presence when the risky conduct creating the danger occurred) is required under § 318 and no dangerous condition existed independent of the plaintiffs’ voluntary conduct.
- The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed: it held no duty existed under § 318 or common-law premises liability because the landowner was not shown to be present when the conduct creating the risk occurred and the shooting activity (and instruments) were brought onto the land by the injured party and companions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a landowner owes a duty under Restatement § 318 to control third-party users without being physically present | Correia: duty turns on knowledge/ability to control, not physical presence; those are factual questions | Bettencourt: § 318 requires presence (or presence when risky conduct creating danger occurred); no evidence of presence here | No duty under § 318; presence (or presence when dangerous conduct creating the risk occurred) is required for liability |
| Whether premises-liability imposes duty for shooting activity introduced by invitees/licensees | Correia: allowing shooting on property created a dangerous condition landowner should remedy | Bettencourt: plaintiffs brought guns and created the dangerous activity; no preexisting dangerous condition known to owner | No premises-liability duty; activity/instrumentality was voluntarily brought by plaintiffs, not an owner-created dangerous condition |
| Whether factual disputes about knowledge/control preclude summary judgment | Correia: knowledge and control are factual issues unsuitable for summary judgment | Bettencourt: absence of evidence of presence or ability to control is dispositive | Court: no genuine dispute of material fact on duty; summary judgment proper because duty (a question of law) did not exist |
| Scope of landowner duty beyond Volpe and § 318 (public policy/foreseeability) | Correia: foreseeability, burden, and public policy support imposing duty even without presence | Bettencourt: expanding duty would conflict with precedent and Restatement framework | Court declined to broaden duty; limited to Volpe/§ 318 conditions requiring presence |
Key Cases Cited
- Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699 (R.I. 2003) (adopts Restatement § 318 duty for possessors present when third-party conduct creating risk occurs)
- Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245 (R.I. 2012) (no general duty to control third-party conduct absent specific circumstances)
- Phelps v. Hebert, 93 A.3d 942 (R.I. 2014) (landowner did not owe duty where defendants lacked legal ability to control ATV operator)
- Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987) (ad hoc duty analysis considering foreseeability and policy factors)