Adam Boots v. D. Young Chevrolet, LLC d/b/a Penske Chevrolet, and Capital One Auto Finance, Inc., 93 N.E.3d 793

Buyer Adam Boots (Maryland resident) traveled to Indiana to purchase a 2005 Chevrolet Corvette advertised by Penske Chevrolet in Indianapolis; he and salesperson Paul Fiene negotiated a price, tested the car, and began signing purchase paperwork.
While signing, Fiene showed Boots a Carfax and disclosed the car had been a manufacturer buyback (a "lemon") but said it had been repaired and "everything was fine now."
Boots asked whether the title had been branded; Fiene assured him the title was "fine," then gave a signed "WE OWE" form stating the State of Indiana did not brand the title. Relying on that, Boots completed the purchase.
Over a year later, Boots learned the Indiana certificate of title bore a manufacturer buyback brand. Boots sued Penske Chevrolet and Capital One (assignee) for fraud and violation of Indiana's Buyback Vehicle Disclosure Law; he abandoned his Magnuson-Moss claim on appeal.
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) statutory disclosure and warranty requirements under the Buyback Vehicle Disclosure Law apply to any Indiana resale of a buyback vehicle and (2) Penske committed actionable fraud by misrepresenting the title condition and omitting material facts Boots had specifically inquired about.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability of Indiana Buyback Vehicle Disclosure Law to resale transactions	Boots: statute covers all sales, leases, transfers, or replacements of buyback vehicles in Indiana — not limited to first resale.	Penske: statute only applies to the first dealer resale after manufacturer repurchase/refurbishment (citing AG guidance).	Court: Reversed trial court; statute unambiguously applies to all Indiana resales by a dealer or manufacturer; summary judgment for Boots.
Common-law fraud based on title representations/omissions	Boots: Fiene’s oral assurances and the signed "WE OWE" statement that the title was not branded were false, made knowingly (Carfax present), relied on by Boots, and proximately caused harm.	Penske: Boots was in pari delicto or sought an unbranded title himself, so defendants should be barred from relief.	Court: Rejected in pari delicto defense; factual record shows Boots merely requested information and relied on assurances; reversed trial court and entered summary judgment for Boots on fraud.

First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley, 891 N.E.2d 604 (Ind. Ct. App.) (summary judgment standard and burden when defendant moves).
Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Group v. Blaskie, 727 N.E.2d 13 (Ind.) (definition of material and genuine issues in summary judgment).
Clem v. Watts, 27 N.E.3d 789 (Ind. Ct. App.) (statutory interpretation on undisputed facts appropriate for summary judgment).
Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d 1133 (Ind.) (legislative intent and plain-meaning rule).
Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82 (Ind.) (statutory ambiguity and harmonizing sections).
State v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind.) (legislative intent found in statutory text).
AutoXchange.com, Inc. v. Dreyer & Reinbold, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. Ct. App.) (role of trial-court findings in summary judgment review).
Kesling v. Huber Nissan, Inc., 997 N.E.2d 327 (Ind.) (elements of common-law fraud and duty to disclose upon inquiry).
Lawson v. Hale, 902 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App.) (seller’s duty to fully disclose problems when buyer inquires).