Adair v. City of Norton
2017 Ohio 5619
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Norton has no wastewater treatment plant; some Norton areas discharge to Barberton’s wastewater plant; the Spring Avenue Outfall area (where the Homeowners live) has sewers owned primarily by Summit County but discharges into Barberton and receives bills from Barberton.
- Barberton and Norton entered a 1997 75-year agreement under which Barberton provides sewage transport/treatment for Norton and bills Norton customers; rates for Norton customers were set relative to Barberton rates.
- A 2003 consulting study recommended Norton adopt a sanitary sewer surcharge (27.5% of Barberton’s user rate) to fund capital projects; the draft and study stated the surcharge would apply to Norton-owned sewers and Summit County sewers that discharge into Barberton.
- Norton enacted Loc.Ord. 1042.06 (2003) imposing a 27.5% surcharge on "users connected to the City’s sanitary sewer system" and specifically charging customers whose sewers ultimately discharge to Barberton; Homeowners (Spring Avenue Outfall) were billed the surcharge.
- Homeowners sued seeking refunds and injunctive/declaratory relief, arguing the ordinance applies only to users connected to sewers owned/operated by Norton, not county-owned sewers; trial court granted summary judgment to Norton, this court remanded for clarification, trial court again granted summary judgment in Norton’s favor, and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "users connected to the City’s sanitary sewer system" unambiguously excludes homeowners whose sewers are owned by Summit County | Adair: Phrase means only users connected to sewers owned/operated/contracted for by Norton, so Homeowners are excluded | Norton: Phrase includes all users within Norton’s established sewer service (including county-owned lines that discharge through Norton to Barberton); Homeowners are within that system | Ambiguous phrase; applying R.C. 1.49 factors, Council intended to include Homeowners; summary judgment for Norton affirmed |
| Whether the ordinance must be interpreted by referencing the 1997 Agreement or statutory definitions | Adair: Must look to ownership/definitions (Ohio Rev. Code/OAC) or the 1997 Agreement which excludes county package plants | Norton: Legislative intent is shown in the ordinance preamble and consulting study; no need to rely on the 1997 Agreement or external statutory definitions | Court relied on ordinance preamble and study to find intent to include Summit County sewers discharging to Barberton; did not need 1997 Agreement or external definitions |
| Whether application of the surcharge to Homeowners violates the ordinance’s plain language | Adair: Plain language confines surcharges to Norton-owned sewer users | Norton: Plain language plus preamble/study supports broader application to all users whose flow discharges to Barberton | Court found plain meaning ambiguous and resolved ambiguity by legislative intent — Homeowners covered |
| Whether the prior remand affected summary judgment standard or evidence required | Adair: Trial court previously failed to find ambiguity; remand required proper interpretation | Norton: Trial court conducted alternate analysis and found in Norton’s favor on the merits | Court held remand issues resolved; addressed ambiguity and applied R.C. 1.49 factors; affirmed summary judgment for Norton |
Key Cases Cited
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (Ohio 1996) (de novo appellate review of summary judgment)
- Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (Ohio 1977) (summary judgment standard under Civ.R. 56)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (Ohio 1996) (moving party’s burden in summary judgment and reciprocal burden of nonmoving party)
- State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447 (Ohio 1996) (nonmoving party’s burden to show genuine issue)
- Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197 (Ohio 1980) (presumption of regularity where record is incomplete)
- State ex rel. Patterson v. Youngstown, 10 Ohio St.3d 8 (Ohio 1984) (courts may consider R.C. 1.49 factors when interpreting ambiguous ordinances)