Ackerman v. Exxonmobil Corp.
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16336
| 4th Cir. | 2013Background
- Koch action (2004) in Maryland state court alleged state-law MTBE contamination claims against Exxon and Hicks; introduced class action framework.
- Exxon removed Koch to federal court under federal officer removal but Koch remanded by Second Circuit (2007) due to lack of officer nexus.
- Ackerman (2011) filed in Harford County Circuit Court seeking to pursue former class members; Koch court anticipated consolidation with Ackerman.
- Ackerman removed the Ackerman case to federal court under Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1503 (MTBE-related claims filed after Aug. 8, 2005).
- Koch was amended on Dec 1, 2011 to include Ackerman plaintiffs; defendants argued amendment void, arguing § 1446(d) bar and Anti-Injunction Act implications.
- District court denied remand but abstained, staying Ackerman pending Koch resolution in state court; defendants appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Koch and Ackerman parallel actions for Colorado River purposes? | Koch as amended is parallel to Ackerman given substantially similar parties and claims. | The Koch amendment is void ab initio; pre-amendment Koch and Ackerman are not parallel. | Yes; amendments not void; Koch and Ackerman parallel. |
| Does § 1446(d) render the Koch amendment void ab initio? | Amendment not void; §1446(d) targets removed case only. | Amendment void ab initio because post-removal actions in Koch were improper. | Amendment not void under §1446(d). |
| Does the Anti-Injunction Act permit enjoining Koch amendment, given § 1446(d) and potential ‘expressly authorized’ exception? | §1446(d) may authorize injunctions against copycat state actions; plaintiffs may be subverting removal. | Amendment may be enjoined if intended to subvert jurisdiction; argues for injunction under AIA exception. | District court could consider, but court need not enjoin; abstention upheld. |
| Did the district court abuse its discretion in abstaining under Colorado River? | Parallel state and federal actions and judicial economy justify abstention. | Abstention inappropriate given extensive federal involvement and not clearly exceptional. | Abstention affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (U.S. 1976) (framework for exceptional circumstances abstention in parallel state-federal suits)
- Chase Brexton Health Servs., Inc. v. Maryland, 411 F.3d 457 (4th Cir. 2005) (parallelism standard; factors for weighing abstention)
- McLaughlin v. United Va. Bank, 955 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1992) (pendency of state action does not bar federal jurisdiction)
- Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2000) (factors for Colorado River abstention include relative progress and forum convenience)
- Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (exceptional circumstances and the narrow scope of Colorado River abstention)
- Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1997) (expressly authorized Anti-Injunction Act and copycat actions)
- KPERS v. State of Kansas, 77 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 1996) (post-removal state actions to subvert removal may warrant injunction)
- Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1987) (injunctions against post-removal state proceedings when duplicative)
- Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (U.S. 1972) (expressly authorized exception under Anti-Injunction Act)
- Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (U.S. 1988) (AIA exceptions and federal injunctive power; comity principles)