380 S.W.3d 291
Tex. App.2012Background
- Simpkins fell at Coca-Cola Enterprises on September 9, 2005, was hospitalized that day, and died seven days later.
- Ace Fire denied the workers’ compensation claim; the appeals panel ruled Simpkins’s death arose from a compensable injury, and Ace Fire sued in district court.
- Cynthia Simpkins, surviving spouse, testified about Simpkins’s medical history and predispositions to stroke/TIA but could not identify the fall’s cause at Coca-Cola.
- Sims and Edwards, Coca-Cola employees, testified Simpkins’s job did not reveal any floor hazard or substance causing the fall; Edwards noted no pre-fall floor problems.
- Dr. Nieto testified that Simpkins was at risk for stroke/heart issues, but could not determine the fall’s cause; Dr. Krouse, after autopsy, found skull fracture and head trauma as death cause, not a stroke.
- The trial court instructed the jury on compensable injury and, over Ace Fire’s objections, included a producing-cause element; the jury found a producing cause linking the fall to death.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the fall originated in or arose out of employment. | Simpkins's death arose from employment as floor instrumentality and job duties linked to fall. | No evidence that employment caused or contributed to the fall; injury not arising out of employment. | Legally sufficient evidence supports arising out of employment; not conclusively disproven. |
| Delivering producing-cause instruction when not disputed. | Producing cause was improperly submitted because the producing-cause issue was undisputed, and the instruction was unnecessary. | Producing cause should not have been submitted as it concerned undisputed facts. | Submitting producing cause was harmless; not reversible. |
| Whether the producing-cause definition was legally incorrect and harmful. | The definition used did not include 'without which' language and was incorrect. | Even with incorrect definition, producing-cause was not contested; thus harmless. | Definition incorrect but harmless error; no reversal. |
| Failure to submit additional course/scope definitions and related instructions. | Court should have given definitions aligning with evidence on course, scope, and compensable injury. | Court did not abuse discretion; proposed instructions were properly refused. | No abuse of discretion; failure to submit challenged instructions not reversible. |
| Burden of proof and potential improper weighting in Question No. 1. | Question No. 1 framed as proving a negative; may comment on weight of evidence. | As appealing party, Ace Fire bore the burden to prove negative; phrasing was permissible with accompanying instructions. | Question phrasing upheld; burden properly allocated; not reversible. |
Key Cases Cited
- Garcia v. Tex. Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 413, 209 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1948) (causal connection between employment conditions and injury; injury can arise out of employment when linked to work)
- Page v. Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 553 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1977) (fact issue on whether injury originated out of employment; idiopathic falls may still be compensable)
- Wickersham v. Gen. Ins. Co., 235 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1950) (recovery allowed where fall caused by employment premises; fall from floor can be compensable)
- Bush v. State Hosp. Sys. (Dallas), 667 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983) (evidence supports injury within course and scope when injury arises from employment-related infirmity and aid/handling by employer)
- Bratcher v. Employers' Casualty Co., 823 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992) (nonemployment-related fatal condition; evidence did not tie death to employment; rarity of producing cause)
- Crump v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 330 S.W.3d 214 (Tex. 2011) (producing cause defined as substantial factor; incorrect definition harmful when producing cause is sole issue)
- Baker v. Continental Cas. Co., 355 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011) (incorrect producing cause definition harmful when causation element is sole issue)
- Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1971) (abuse of charge standard for undisputed facts; reviewing court limits reversible error)
- Central Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. 2007) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence; favorable to finding if reasonable jury could decide)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (directs schools for reviewing legal sufficiency with standard; probative evidence)
- Crowson v. Bowen, 320 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010) (abuse of discretion standard for jury instructions)
- Romero v. KPH Constr., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2005) (harmful error standard for jury instruction relevance)
- Trice v. State, 712 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. App.—Waco 1986) (undisputed facts and harmless error in jury charges)