351 F. Supp. 3d 1141
E.D. Ill.2018Background
- Plaintiffs: two individuals who use motorized wheelchairs (Garcia, Cooper) and Access Living (a disability-advocacy org); a third individual (Patrick) and Access Living initially alleged but Patrick and Access Living were dismissed on standing/statutory grounds. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief under ADA Titles III and §12184.
- Defendant: Uber operates a smartphone rideshare platform (including an "UberWAV" option) but does not own drivers’ vehicles; complaint alleges Uber controls many aspects of the service and that wheelchair-accessible rides are effectively unavailable in Chicago.
- Core factual claim: Uber provided an extremely small number of rides to motorized-wheelchair users and told Access Living it did not intend to provide equivalent response times; plaintiffs say they are deterred from using the app.
- Procedural posture: Uber moved to dismiss for lack of standing (Rule 12(b)(1)) and for judgment on the pleadings (Rule 12(c)); court treated the jurisdictional challenge as facial and reviewed pleadings only.
- Remedy sought: duty to provide "equivalent" access (more available wheelchair-accessible vehicles) via reasonable modification of policies/practices.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing — individual plaintiffs (injury-in-fact via deterrence) | Plaintiffs assert they are reasonably deterred from using Uber because of lack of accessible rides, creating a real and immediate threat of future discrimination. | Uber contends plaintiffs lack concrete injury because they never downloaded the app or requested rides; deterrence is speculative. | Court: Garcia and Cooper have standing based on reasonable deterrence and alleged ongoing discrimination; Patrick lacks personal knowledge and dismissed without prejudice. |
| Organizational standing (Access Living) | Access Living says Uber's discrimination forced it to incur increased transportation costs, harming its mission and diverting resources. | Uber says alleged harms are only abstract setbacks to mission and insufficiently particularized. | Court: Article III standing satisfied (resource diversion alleged) but Access Living lacks a private right of action under Title III because it was not itself "subjected to discrimination." Access Living's suit dismissed on statutory grounds. |
| Whether Uber is a public accommodation under Title III | Plaintiffs: Uber operates a travel/transportation service (not just an electronic intermediary) and thus is subject to Title III and §12184. | Uber: A "place of public accommodation" must be a physical space; also disputes that it is "primarily engaged in transporting people." | Court: Adopts Seventh Circuit dicta favoring non-physical public accommodations; plaintiffs plausibly alleged Uber operates a travel/transportation service and may fall under §12182 and §12184. |
| Reasonable modification and causation | Plaintiffs allege Access Living notified Uber and requested equivalent service; Uber controls drivers sufficiently to coerce supply; injunction directing Uber to use that control could redress injury. | Uber says drivers are independent third parties, so Uber cannot be held responsible for availability; plaintiffs failed to request specific policy modifications. | Court: Complaint alleges Uber exerts control over drivers and was on notice via Access Living’s meeting, so failure-to-modify claim survives at pleading stage; causation and redressability plausibly pleaded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. 2016) (Article III standing requirements)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (injury must be concrete and imminent for injunctive relief)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2000) (deterrence can constitute injury-in-fact)
- Scherr v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2013) (standing for prospective ADA relief requires real and immediate threat or reasonable deterrence)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (U.S. 1982) (organizational standing where defendant's conduct perceptibly impairs organization's mission and drains resources)
- Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (Title III applies to non-physical providers such as travel services)
- Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999) (discusses limits on Title III and access/content distinction)
- Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2001) (interpreting "public accommodation" beyond physical sites)
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (U.S. 1997) (causation and when a defendant's action is a determinative or coercive cause)
- PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (U.S. 2001) (ADA's broad remedial purpose)
- Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (deterrence as injury-in-fact)
- Village of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing online intermediaries and discussing what it means to "operate" a service)