Abromats v. Abromats, 0:16-cv-60653

Background

Brothers Clifford (trustee) and Philip (attorney) dispute control and use of two family trusts (Gloria and George Trusts) arising from alleged undue influence and trust amendments.
Philip filed initially pro se in the Western District of New York; his wife Letitia (also an attorney) and other counsel have represented him in this litigation; Philip drafted many filings and communicated directly with Clifford.
Clifford moved to sanction and disqualify Philip, his law firm, and Letitia based primarily on an October 10, 2016 email and alleged impermissible practice of law by Philip.
Philip moved to reconsider the court’s denial of his request to enjoin Clifford from using trust funds to pay litigation expenses (the Fee‑Injunction Motion).
The court found Philip had been timely served with Florida statutory notice that Clifford intended to use trust funds and that Philip failed to show a reasonable basis for a breach‑of‑trust injunction or new grounds for reconsideration.
The court denied Clifford’s sanctions/disqualification request but ordered that Philip not initiate direct contact with Clifford (absent permission) and required filings to show the submitting law firm; it also denied Philip’s motion to reconsider.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Philip should be sanctioned/disqualified for practicing law while represented and for an offensive email	Clifford: Philip drafted filings, supervised legal work, sent a threatening email, and thus engaged in impermissible practice warranting sanctions/disqualification	Philip: He is represented by counsel (Letitia, Buck, Joseph); his work was overseen, filings were signed and submitted by counsel, and he has not violated court orders	Denied — court found no bad‑faith basis to treat Philip as improperly practicing law; ordered limited no‑contact and clarified filing attribution requirements
Whether Clifford provided sufficient notice under Fla. Stat. § 736.0802(10)(b) of intent to use trust funds	Clifford: Served statutory notice by email on Philip’s counsel; adequate under Florida rules	Philip: Claimed notices were defective because of timing/filing in state court and challenged sufficiency	Held: Notice was properly served by email to Philip’s counsel and Philip had actual knowledge; notice sufficient
Whether reconsideration of denial of injunction to bar use of trust funds is warranted	Philip: Court erred on notice and on finding no reasonable basis to believe Clifford breached trust; requested evidentiary hearing	Clifford: Prior record supported denial; no new controlling law or strongly convincing evidence presented	Denied — Philip failed to present new facts/law of strongly convincing nature; court alternatively exercised discretion to deny injunction
Whether an evidentiary hearing was required before denying the injunction	Philip: Hearing required before denial	Clifford: Not necessary on this record	Held: No reconsideration warranted for lack of hearing; generally hearings are not required absent special circumstances

Key Cases Cited

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (federal courts possess inherent power to sanction for bad faith)
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (inherent sanctioning powers must be exercised with restraint)
Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 1998) (bad faith is key to invoking inherent sanction power)
Lomax v. Ruvin, [citation="476 F. App'x 175"] (11th Cir. 2012) (reconsideration requires new facts or law of strongly convincing nature)
Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757 (11th Cir. 2005) (motion for reconsideration cannot relitigate matters that could have been raised earlier)