150 F.4th 851
7th Cir.2025Background
- Plaintiff Abre Jackson, an Illinois prisoner, was involved in a cell altercation at Stateville; correctional officer Anastacio allegedly sprayed chemical agent and Jackson was later transferred to Pontiac.
- A March 13, 2020 disciplinary adjustment hearing at Pontiac (committee of two) found Jackson guilty; he was sentenced to three months of disciplinary segregation and other penalties; he was not allowed to call witnesses or view video at the hearing.
- Jackson alleges the segregation cells at Pontiac were deplorable: feces and urine on walls, constant noise/assaultive inmates, contaminated water, roaches and mice, and other unsanitary conditions.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding three months of segregation did not, as a matter of law, deprive Jackson of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.
- The Seventh Circuit panel disagreed that summary judgment on the liberty-interest question was warranted (holding a triable fact issue exists), but affirmed the judgment for defendants because the officials are entitled to qualified immunity—the law was not clearly established in March 2020.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jackson's 3-month disciplinary segregation combined with alleged filthy conditions deprived him of a protected liberty interest | Jackson: the duration plus deplorable conditions imposed an "atypical and significant hardship" under Sandin/Wilkinson | Defendants: three months alone is insufficient; conditions do not reach atypicality required | Court: a genuine factual dispute exists whether a liberty interest was deprived (reversing district court on that narrow point) |
| Whether the disciplinary hearing procedures (no witnesses, no video) violated due process | Jackson: denial of witnesses and video review made the hearing constitutionally deficient | Defendants: hearing provided notice and opportunity to be heard; more formal procedures unnecessary | Court: did not decide the merits of procedure claim; assumed process might be required if a liberty interest existed but resolved case on qualified immunity |
| Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for imposing the segregation | Jackson: officials violated clearly established law and so are not immune | Defendants: law was ambiguous on whether three months plus these conditions created a liberty interest; immunity applies | Court: defendants entitled to qualified immunity; right was not clearly established in March 2020 |
| Availability of damages or remedy related points | Jackson sought damages for procedural due process violation | Defendants noted good-time credits were later restored and argued immunity bars damages | Court: even if liberty interest existed, qualified immunity bars damages; restoration of credits addressed related good-time claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoners entitled to limited procedural protections before forfeiture of good-time or imposition of solitary)
- Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (due-process liberty interest requires an "atypical and significant hardship" compared to ordinary prison life)
- Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (extreme conditions plus indeterminate duration can create a liberty interest that triggers process)
- Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020) (summary reversal underscoring that obviously deplorable cell conditions are unconstitutional)
- Marion v. Columbia Correctional Institute, 559 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009) (duration and conditions must be assessed together; long terms may suffice without harshness showing)
- Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2013) (qualified immunity often applies in solitary-confinement liberty-interest cases; merits/certainty issues explained)
- Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2015) (conditions can make even relatively short segregation atypical)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two-prong framework; courts have discretion on which prong to decide)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (government officials protected from suit unless statutory or constitutional right was clearly established)