Abraham Contreras-Sanchez v. Merrick Garland
20-4295
| 6th Cir. | Jul 12, 2021Background
- Contreras entered the U.S. illegally in 2001, pleaded guilty to DWI and leaving the scene of a personal-injury accident, and conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
- He applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1); the IJ found he met all statutory requirements except the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" prong.
- Contreras is married to an undocumented wife; they have five U.S.-citizen children (≈5–16 years). The family planned to relocate to live with relatives in Telixtac, Mexico if Contreras were removed.
- Evidence included testimony from Contreras and family, and an expert declaration from Prof. Todd V. Fletcher about shortcomings in the Mexican education system; IJ gave the report limited weight.
- The IJ denied cancellation, granted voluntary departure, and ordered removal; the BIA dismissed the appeal, concluding hardships (economic/educational, smaller housing, lower wages) were not "exceptional and extremely unusual."
- On appeal, the Sixth Circuit dismissed challenges to factual findings for lack of jurisdiction and denied the remainder of the petition on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Contreras' Argument | Government/BIA Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction to review factual findings supporting hardship | IJ and BIA erred factually (e.g., children do not speak Spanish); these errors should be reviewed | Factual determinations are not reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B) for discretionary cancellation | Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as to factual challenges |
| Whether BIA/IJ misapplied precedents on "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" by imposing a bright-line rule excluding diminished educational/economic opportunities | BIA applied a rule that economic/educational harms short of destitution cannot qualify and failed to consider cumulative hardship | BIA/IJ considered factors cumulatively (education, housing, wages, family support) and reasonably concluded hardships were not extraordinary | Denied — BIA/IJ did not misapply precedent and decision was reasonable |
| Comparison to In re Gonzalez Recinas and other BIA precedents | Recinas is directly on point; BIA misstated facts and failed to treat number/language deficits of children as worse here | BIA relied on relevant differences (family support, spousal support, children's Spanish ability) and correctly compared cases | Denied — BIA's comparative reasoning was reasonable |
| Whether moving the children is a "choice" (i.e., mother could remain and children stay) | Leaving children in U.S. with undocumented mother is infeasible; moving is not a voluntary choice | No removal proceedings against mother; BIA/IJ should not speculate about her removal; decision whether children stay is a family choice | Denied — BIA/IJ properly treated relocation as a choice and declined to assume mother's removal |
Key Cases Cited
- Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020) ("questions of law" include application of legal standard to undisputed facts)
- Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 2021) (reviewability of mixed question re: hardship and standards of deference)
- Aburto-Rocha v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2008) (agency failure to follow its precedent is non-discretionary error)
- Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287 (6th Cir. 2016) (review both IJ and BIA where BIA adopts and supplements IJ decision)
- Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (framework for deference to agency interpretations of their own rules discussed)
- United States v. Riccardi, 989 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2021) (discussion of Auer/Kisor deference issues)
