Aberts, L. v. Verna, P., 1214 EDA 2016

Background

Verna bought residential property (3364 Upper Valley Rd.) from the Charbonniers in early 2011 through his agent/employee William Reynolds; closing was delayed (deed executed by wife Feb 10, 2011; husband Mar 25, 2011). During the delay Paul Charbonnier obtained a March 17, 2011 estimate for a sump-pump installation. No sump pump was installed before resale.
Reynolds occupied the property for Verna and completed the Seller’s Property Disclosure Statement for Verna in July 2012, stating the seller was unaware of basement water infiltration and that there was no sump pump.
Aberts purchased the property from Verna in 2012; she later experienced repeated basement flooding and paid $14,538.85 to remediate flood damage. One remediation estimate came from the same company that prepared the March 2011 sump-pump estimate.
Aberts sued Verna (failure to disclose latent defects, misrepresentation, RESDL, and UTPCPL). An arbitration panel sided with Aberts; Verna demanded trial de novo. After a one-day bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for Aberts for $14,538.85 and awarded $5,867.50 in attorney’s fees under the UTPCPL.
The trial court found (based chiefly on circumstantial evidence) that Reynolds had knowledge of the water issue, that Reynolds’s knowledge was imputable to Verna, and that Verna (through Reynolds) failed to disclose the defect. Post-trial motions were denied by operation of law. The Superior Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Aberts' Argument	Verna's Argument	Held
Sufficiency: Did plaintiff prove Verna knew of water infiltration / imputation of agent's knowledge?	Reynolds (seller’s agent) knew of delay and the 2011 sump-pump estimate; his representations (Disclosure Statement) support imputation to Verna.	No direct evidence that Reynolds knew of the 2011 estimate before Verna bought the property; inferring knowledge from the deed delay was insufficient/speculative.	Court affirmed: circumstantial evidence (delay + estimate + agency relationship + Reynolds’ occupation and role) supported reasonable inference of agent knowledge imputed to Verna.
Attorney’s fees under UTPCPL: What proof standard applies to award fees (preponderance vs. clear and convincing)?	Aberts relied on preponderance; UTPCPL private claims are governed by preponderance.	Verna urged a heightened clear-and-convincing standard for UTPCPL fraud-based claims (relying on Feeney).	Court followed Boehm and held preponderance applies to UTPCPL private actions; attorney’s-fee award stands.
Treble/doubled damages under UTPCPL: Should court award punitive/treble damages?	Aberts urged sanctioning/doubled damages given alleged fraudulent conduct and policy to deter concealment.	Verna argued actual damages only / conduct insufficient for treble damages.	Court exercised discretion and declined treble damages, awarding actual damages plus counsel fees as sufficient to make plaintiff whole.
Post-verdict / appellate attorney’s fees: Should trial court reassess and award continuing fees now?	Aberts asked reassessment to include post-verdict and appeal-related fees.	Verna opposed immediate reassessment.	Court declined to award additional post-verdict/appellate fees now as premature and deferred that determination to the Superior Court on remand/after appeal.

Key Cases Cited

Smith v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 153 A.2d 477 (Pa. 1959) (circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences may sustain a factfinder’s verdict)
Holt v. Navarro, 932 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. 2007) (standard of review for JNOV and post-trial sufficiency review)
Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425 (Pa. 2004) (UTPCPL requires justifiable reliance and ascertainable loss)
Feeney v. Disston Manor Pers. Care Home, Inc., 849 A.2d 590 (Pa. Super. 2004) (discusses fraud element proofs under UTPCPL; relied on by defendant but distinguished)
Boehm v. Riversource Life Ins. Co., 117 A.3d 308 (Pa. Super. 2015) (private UTPCPL claims governed by preponderance of the evidence; adopted by court here)