Abegg v. Adams/Arapahoe School District J8/Aurora Public Schools, 1:12-cv-01084

Background

Plaintiff William Abegg and his disabled children were involved in a school-bullying incident at Fulton Elementary; staff allegedly instructed Abegg to leave the property without considering due process.
A January 20, 2012 directive barred Abegg from entering Aurora Public Schools premises except for prearranged meetings, without notice or a hearing, and restricted contact with staff and students.
Abegg was later charged with trespassing in Aurora Municipal Court based on the directive, with a conviction on June 6, 2012.
Abegg alleges procedural and substantive due process violations and a First Amendment retaliation claim arising from the trespass directive and related actions.
Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing no constitutional deprivation or First Amendment retaliation, and entitlement to qualified immunity.
The court reviews the complaint under Twombly/Iqbal standards, accepts well-pled facts as true, and considers documents central to the claim attached to the motion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Abegg states a due process claim.	Abegg claims a protected liberty/property interest and denial of due process.	No cognizable protected interest; rules and directives are administrative.	Due process claim dismissed for lack of protected interest.
Whether Abegg has a protected liberty interest to access school property for due process purposes.	Troxel-based parental rights extend to school access for participation in education.	Parent access to school property is not a constitutionally protected interest.	No liberty interest in accessing school property; directive permissible to maintain order.
Whether Abegg states a substantive due process claim.	Actions were arbitrary and shock the conscience.	No outrageous or conscience-shocking conduct established.	Substantive due process claim dismissed; actions not conscience-shocking.
Whether Abegg states a First Amendment retaliation claim against the District or individuals.	No-trespass directive retaliated against his speech about safety and bullying.	No causal link showing but-for retaliation; vague or conclusory pleading.	First Amendment retaliation claim dismissed for lack of causation and factual specificity.
Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the §1983 claims.	Rights violated; but-for actions caused harm.	If no viable §1983 claim, qualified immunity applies.	Qualified immunity►inapplicable because no viable §1983 claim; nonetheless,早 court grants dismissal on the merits.

Key Cases Cited

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must include plausible grounds, not mere conclusory statements)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plaintiffs must plead facts showing plausible CLAIMS, not mere recitals)
Morse v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 1998) (justify that courts may disregard conclusory allegations at 12(b)(6))
Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2012) (context-specific plausibility standard for pleading)
Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2007) (Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard explained)
Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 1999) (public-access claims and state-interest considerations)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (parental rights to directing child’s education discussed; not equivalent to school access rights)