Abdel-Samed v. Dailey
294 Ga. 758
| Ga. | 2014Background
- On Dec. 11, 2005 Ryan Dailey presented to Spalding Regional Medical Center (SRMC) after a high‑pressure paint‑thinner puncture to his finger; PA Mark Epps and Dr. Gihan Abdel‑Samed diagnosed need for immediate hand surgery.
- SRMC lacked an on‑call hand surgeon; Abdel‑Samed spoke with Dr. John Seiler (a hand surgeon at Piedmont), who agreed to accept the patient, but transfer was not effected until ~7:33 a.m.; Ryan arrived at Piedmont ~9:45 a.m. and underwent emergency surgery.
- Daileys sued Abdel‑Samed and Epps for delayed transfer/medical malpractice, alleging the delay caused fingertip amputation and lasting impairment.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, invoking OCGA § 51‑1‑29.5(c), which imposes a clear‑and‑convincing proof requirement (gross negligence) for claims arising from emergency medical care in an ED.
- Trial court granted summary judgment; Court of Appeals reversed as to applicability of § 51‑1‑29.5(c). Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve applicability and whether gross negligence issue precluded summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants’ conduct was "emergency medical care" under OCGA § 51‑1‑29.5(a)(5) | Daileys: yes — Ryan needed emergency surgery and care arose from that emergency | Defendants: yes — they provided emergency care (diagnosis, efforts to transfer) | Held: Yes; undisputed evidence shows bona fide emergency medical care, so § 51‑1‑29.5(c) applies |
| Meaning of "bona fide" in "bona fide emergency services" — requires good faith? | Daileys: "bona fide" means acts done in good faith; if providers acted in bad faith, heightened protection shouldn't apply | Defendants: "bona fide" means genuine/actual emergency services, not provider subjective good faith | Held: "Bona fide" means genuine/actual emergency services (not a separate good‑faith requirement) |
| Whether the heightened gross‑negligence standard (clear and convincing) defeats plaintiffs’ claims on summary judgment | Daileys: even under the heightened standard, facts raise dispute about timeliness and efforts to transfer (calls not made, available surgeon at MCCG) | Defendants: their actions show at least slight diligence; they directed staff to seek transfer and contacted Seiler | Held: Disputed facts (e.g., whether MCCG was called and the 5.5‑hour delay) could support a jury finding of gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence — summary judgment denied |
| Whether Crewey controls (i.e., no emergency care provided so statute inapplicable) | Daileys: analogize to Crewey to argue statute shouldn't apply if defendants effectively failed to provide emergency services | Defendants: Crewey is distinguishable — there the defendant provided no emergency care; here diagnosis and transfer efforts were emergency care | Held: Crewey is distinguishable; defendants did provide emergency services, so Crewey does not preclude application of § 51‑1‑29.5(c) |
Key Cases Cited
- Crewey v. American Medical Response of Ga., 303 Ga. App. 258 (Court of Appeals of Ga.) (distinguishing case where defendant provided no emergency services)
- Bonds v. Nesbitt, 322 Ga. App. 852 (Court of Appeals of Ga.) (definition of health care and emergency care context)
- Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7 (Ga. 2010) (definition of gross negligence as absence of even slight diligence)
- Johnson v. Omondi, 294 Ga. 74 (Ga. 2013) (summary judgment standard and application of heightened burden under § 51‑1‑29.5(c))
- Trustees of Trinity College v. Ferris, 228 Ga. App. 476 (Ga. App. 1997) (jury resolves whether negligence rises to gross negligence)