Abbott v. Perez
138 S. Ct. 2305
| SCOTUS | 2018

Background

  • After the 2010 census Texas redrew congressional and legislative maps in 2011; those maps were litigated and never used. The Western District of Texas (three-judge court) adopted interim maps for 2012 primaries; this Court in Perry v. Perez instructed the court to start with the Legislature’s plans but adjust for constitutional or VRA defects. The Legislature enacted the court’s interim plans (with minor changes) in 2013 and Texas used them in 2014 and 2016.
  • The D.C. district court denied §5 preclearance of the 2011 plans in 2012; after Shelby County (invalidating §4 coverage formula) Texas obtained vacatur of that preclearance order and repealed the 2011 plans in 2013.
  • Plaintiffs amended to challenge the 2013 enacted maps; after extensive proceedings, the Texas court (2017) found the 2011 plans tainted by discriminatory intent, concluded the 2013 Legislature failed to "purge the taint," and invalidated multiple 2013 congressional and state‑house districts on intent or §2 effects grounds; it ordered quick remedial steps and set remedial hearings.
  • Texas appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing (inter alia) that the three‑judge court’s orders had the practical effect of injunctions (so §1253 jurisdiction), and that the district court erred by shifting the burden and imputing the 2011 Legislature’s intent to the 2013 Legislature.
  • The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1253 because the orders had the practical effect of enjoining use of the 2013 plans for the upcoming elections; it reversed the Texas court’s finding that the 2013 Legislature had not cured the 2011 "taint" (placing intent burden on challengers), reversed the §2 effects holdings for CD27, HD32, and HD34, but affirmed that HD90 was an impermissible racial gerrymander. Cases were remanded.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Does the Supreme Court have direct-appeal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1253? Orders effectively barred use of 2013 maps and required remedial relief; appeal to SCOTUS is proper. Orders were not injunctions; no direct appeal to SCOTUS. Yes: §1253 covers orders that in practical effect grant or deny injunctions; these orders did so.
Did the district court legally err by treating the 2013 Legislature as required to "purge" the 2011 plans’ discriminatory "taint" (i.e., shift burden)? The 2013 enactment continued unlawful intent; Legislature failed to cure taint. Burden to prove discriminatory intent rests with challengers; presumption of legislative good faith applies to 2013 Legislature. Reversed: burden remains on challengers; the court erred in requiring State to show it purged past taint.
Were CD27, HD32, HD34 unlawful under §2 effects test (Gingles/totality)? Plaintiffs: districts dilute Latino opportunity; alternatives could create more opportunity districts. Texas: geography/demographics prevent creating additional performing Latino districts; current plans lawful. Reversed: plaintiffs failed to show additional reasonably compact, performing opportunity districts could be created (no §2 violation proven).
Was HD90 an unconstitutional racial gerrymander? Plaintiffs: race predominated in drawing HD90 without narrow tailoring. Texas: race predominated but was narrowly tailored to comply with §2 (good reasons). Affirmed: HD90 is an impermissible racial gerrymander; Texas failed to prove narrow tailoring.

Key Cases Cited

  • Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Equal Protection prohibits racial gerrymanders)
  • Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (three‑factor framework for §2 effects claims)
  • League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (§2 requires ‘opportunity’ districts in certain circumstances)
  • Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388 (2012) (three‑judge court should start with legislature’s plan, adjusting only for legal defects)
  • Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (invalidating §4 coverage formula; affected §5 preclearance)
  • Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (presumption of legislative good faith in redistricting and intent inquiry)
  • Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (factors for discerning discriminatory intent)
  • Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997) (burden of proof on challenger when alleging discriminatory intent)
  • Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981) (practical‑effect test for appealability of orders affecting injunctions)
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