709 S.E.2d 743
W. Va.2011Background
- This is the appellants' third appeal seeking reversal of a November 19, 2009 circuit court order dismissing the case on collateral estoppel grounds.
- The circuit court dismissed because Messer II held Dellinger had apparent authority to settle, precluding relitigation against the doctors and HAGI.
- Appellants contend the court failed to distinguish between actual authority (attorney-client) and apparent authority (attorney-third party).
- In Messer II, this Court did not expressly hold that Dellinger had actual authority, only apparent authority to bind the clients to a settlement.
- Appellants filed this suit (Nov. 19, 2008) alleging Dellinger settled without their authorization and that they suffered damages as a result.
- The court below granted dismissal; this Court reverses, holding collateral estoppel does not bar the current action and a jury should decide actual authority.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does collateral estoppel bar the current action? | Abadir et al. were not bound by Messer II on actual authority. | Dellinger’s apparent authority in Messer II estops relitigation of authority issues. | Collateral estoppel does not bar; issue to be decided by jury. |
| Did the circuit court properly distinguish actual vs. apparent authority? | There is a critical distinction; actual authority remains unresolved. | Messer II resolved apparent authority and thus supports estoppel. | Court erred; must allow jury consideration of actual authority. |
| Should there be a jury trial on whether Dellinger had actual authority to settle? | Yes; factual dispute about agency authority requires jury determination. | No; the issue was settled by Messer II. | Remanded for jury trial on actual authority. |
Key Cases Cited
- Messer v. Huntington Anesthesia Group, Inc., 222 W. Va. 410, 664 S.E.2d 751 (2008) (apparent authority to settle and related attorney duties; separate from actual authority)
- Messer v. Huntington Anesthesia Group, Inc., 218 W. Va. 4, 620 S.E.2d 144 (2005) (discrimination suit; procedural background referenced)
- Conley v. Spillers, 171 W. Va. 584, 301 S.E.2d 216 (1983) (collateral estoppel framework and applicability)
- State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995) (criteria for collateral estoppel and identical issues)
- Holloman v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 217 W. Va. 269, 617 S.E.2d 816 (2005) (collateral estoppel requirements; identical issues and full opportunity to litigate)
- Miranosky v. Parson, 152 W. Va. 241, 161 S.E.2d 665 (1968) (presumption of authority in attorney-client appearances)
- Sanson v. Brandywine Homes, Inc., 215 W. Va. 307, 599 S.E.2d 730 (2004) (apparent authority discussed in settlement context)
- Lane v. Williams, 150 W. Va. 96, 144 S.E.2d 234 (1965) (general collateral estoppel principles)
- Laslo v. Griffith, 143 W. Va. 469, 102 S.E.2d 894 (1958) (issues of agency and jury questions on authority)
- Thompson v. Stuckey, 171 W. Va. 483, 300 S.E.2d 295 (1983) (scope of agency authority; jury questions when evidence conflicts)
- Nees v. Julian Goldman Stores, Inc., 109 W. Va. 329, 154 S.E. 769 (1930) (agency authority scope; proper instructions for jury)
- Dwight v. Hazlett, 107 W. Va. 192, 147 S.E. 877 (1929) (attorney authority not implied; presumption when attorney appears)
- Miranosky v. Parson, 152 W. Va. 241, 161 S.E.2d 665 (1968) (attorney appears in court with strong presumption of authority)
- Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 224 W. Va. 160, 680 S.E.2d 791 (2009) (collateral estoppel factors and privity considerations)