Aaron Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball
934 F.3d 918
9th Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiffs: current and former Minor League Baseball players sued MLB, the Commissioner, and multiple MLB clubs alleging unpaid minimum wages and overtime for spring training, extended spring training, instructional leagues (mostly in Arizona/Florida), and championship-season play (including California League).
- Employment terms: players sign a seven-year Uniform Player Contract; many are unpaid during spring/extended training and instructional leagues; low fixed monthly pay during championship season; teams maintain uniform pay policies and schedules.
- Procedural posture: district court certified a California Rule 23(b)(3) class and an FLSA collective, denied Arizona and Florida Rule 23(b)(3) classes and a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class; parties appealed and cross-appealed.
- Key evidentiary tools: plaintiffs relied on representative evidence (a Main Survey), hundreds of team schedules, payroll records, and testimony; they advanced a "continuous workday" theory and Mt. Clemens/Tyson burden-shifting to establish hours and liability.
- Core legal dispute: whether choice-of-law issues, the permissibility of representative evidence, and the continuous workday rule permit certification of state-law Rule 23 classes and an FLSA collective for wage-and-hour claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Choice of law for California Rule 23(b)(3) class | Sullivan supports applying California law to work performed in California; therefore classwide adjudication is appropriate | Choice-of-law differences and many out-of-state employers/residents defeat predominance and adequacy | Affirmed: California law applies to California-class claims under Sullivan and California choice-of-law rules |
| Choice of law for Arizona & Florida Rule 23(b)(3) classes | Apply the law of the state where the work occurred (Arizona/Florida); California’s governmental-interest test supports that result | Class treatment is defeated by individualized choice-of-law inquiries and conflicting state interests | Reversed: Arizona law governs work in Arizona and Florida law governs work in Florida; choice-of-law does not defeat predominance |
| Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive/declaratory class (training facilities in AZ/FL) | Plaintiffs narrowed class and intervenors cure standing; relief concerns common policies (pay practices) and is suitable for (b)(2) relief | District court correctly found lack of "cohesiveness" and individualized choice-of-law issues make (b)(2) inappropriate | Reversed: district court erred in refusing (b)(2) class solely on choice-of-law; also erred in imposing a separate "cohesiveness" requirement for (b)(2); remand to reconsider certification |
| Use of representative evidence and continuous workday; FLSA collective | Representative evidence (Main Survey + schedules/testimony) and continuous workday rule can satisfy Mt. Clemens/Tyson at certification to show liability and hours; similar issues support an FLSA collective | Survey flaws, variation in arrival/departure times, and lack of activity detail make class/collective certification improper; choice-of-law and individualized damages predominate | Affirmed for certification: district court did not abuse discretion—Tyson permits representative evidence at certification; continuous workday doctrine and other evidence meet predominance for CA, AZ, FL classes; FLSA collective certified (Campbell standard applied or harmless error) |
Key Cases Cited
- Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal.4th 1191 (Cal. 2011) (applies California three-step governmental-interest test to determine when California wage law applies to work performed in California)
- Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) (representative/ statistical evidence may be used at class-certification stage and to establish liability where employer failed to keep records)
- Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) (burden-shifting rule when employer failed to keep adequate time records; plaintiff may use reasonable inference to prove hours)
- IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (continuous workday/"integral and indispensable" activities rule defines compensable time)
- Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012) (forum-state choice-of-law rules apply; differences in state law can defeat predominance)
- Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2018) (standard for FLSA collective certification: plaintiffs are similarly situated if they share a similar issue of law or fact material to FLSA claims)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (rigorous analysis of Rule 23(a) commonality requirement; distinguished in wage-hour representative-evidence context)