Aaron Malone v. State of Tennessee
W2016-00666-CCA-R3-PC
| Tenn. Crim. App. | Apr 18, 2017Background
- Aaron Malone was convicted of first-degree felony murder after a jury trial; sentence: life as a violent offender. Conviction affirmed on direct appeal.
- Police linked Malone to the crime via: witness sightings of a teal/turquoise Saturn with taped rear window; convenience-store surveillance showing Malone; co-defendant’s statement implicating Malone and leading to recovery of a sawed-off shotgun; and credit cards found in a third party’s possession who said Malone gave them the cards.
- Malone gave a recorded and written confession after being brought to the homicide office; officers read Miranda warnings; suppression court found the arrest unlawful but, relying on New York v. Harris, declined to suppress the confession as the arrest was supported by probable cause.
- Post-conviction petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (counsel failed to challenge probable cause, failed to challenge delay in judicial probable-cause determination, and failed to obtain unedited footage from the TV show “The First 48”) and a due-process claim based on the State’s failure to preserve unedited TV footage.
- At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing: trial counsel explained he did not pursue the footage because prior inquiries showed producers destroyed unused footage; counsel declined to press a no-probable-cause argument given the State’s corroborating evidence; officers explained the department’s use of a forty-eight-hour hold and that the producers shipped/ destroyed raw footage.
- The post-conviction court denied relief; this Court affirmed, finding counsel’s performance was not deficient and Malone failed to prove prejudice or a preserved due-process Brady/Ferguson claim regarding the destroyed footage.
Issues
| Issue | Malone's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial counsel ineffective for not arguing arrest lacked probable cause | Counsel should have challenged the warrantless entry/arrest; no probable cause | Police had corroborating witness ID, surveillance, co-defendant statement, and recovered weapon info — probable cause existed; counsel reasonably declined a meritless challenge | Denied — counsel not deficient; probable cause supported arrest |
| Trial counsel ineffective for not arguing unreasonable delay in judicial probable-cause determination | Counsel should have argued Gerstein violation / delay before magistrate | Malone was brought before a magistrate within 48 hours; delay was not for improper purpose and was routine to vet charges | Denied — no unreasonable delay; counsel not ineffective |
| Trial counsel ineffective for not obtaining unedited “First 48” footage | Raw footage likely exculpatory or impeaching; counsel should have secured it | Producers shipped footage out of town and destroyed unused segments; counsel reasonably relied on prior inquiry; Malone produced no raw footage at hearing | Denied — no deficiency or prejudice shown |
| Due process / evidence preservation (Brady/Ferguson) claim for State’s failure to preserve TV footage | State had duty to seize footage from private TV producers because footage recorded state activity | Footage never in State’s possession or control; no authority to compel seizure; Malone waived issue by not preserving it earlier | Denied and waived; State had no duty to confiscate producers’ raw footage |
Key Cases Cited
- New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (statements taken after an unlawful arrest supported by probable cause are not necessarily excluded)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: deficiency and prejudice)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (prompt judicial determination of probable cause required after a warrantless arrest)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence)
- State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266 (Tenn. 2012) (definition and standard for probable cause under Tennessee law)
- State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. 1996) (factors for determining whether confession is tainted by prior constitutional violation)
