Aaron Glenn Haygood v. Margarita Garza De Escabedo
356 S.W.3d 390
| Tex. | 2011Background
- Haygood sues Escabedo for injuries from a car collision, requiring neck and shoulder surgeries with residual impairment.
- Twelve providers billed $110,069.12; Medicare Part B paid adjustments bringing owed charges to $27,739.43.
- Medicare/insurance discounts yield large disparities between billed charges and amounts payable.
- Section 41.0105 limits recovery of medical expenses to the amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of the claimant.
- Trial admitted evidence of billed charges and provider reasonableness; jury awarded past/future medical expenses and non-economic damages.
- Court of Appeals reversed the damages award, prompting Supreme Court review on §41.0105’s scope and evidentiary impact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §41.0105 cap damages to paid or incurred expenses? | Haygood argues cap on recoverable expenses only limits recovery, not admissibility. | Escabedo contends cap both limits recovery and admission of non-recoverable charges. | Yes; recovery limited to paid or incurred amounts. |
| Whether collateral source evidence is admissible after §41.0105? | Haygood seeks to admit full billed amounts despite adjustments as collateral sources. | Escabedo relies on collateral source rule to bar evidence of third-party payments or adjustments. | Evidence of non-recoverable charges is inadmissible; collateral source rule remains applicable for recoverable items. |
| Should §41.0105 be applied post-verdict via remittitur/reformation? | Court should remand for remittitur to reflect only recoverable amounts. | Post-verdict modification is improper or unnecessary; adjust at trial would be preferable. | Post-verdict adjustment is appropriate to reflect recoverable medical expenses. |
| Did the Legislature intend to modify evidentiary aspects of damages? | Legislature intended broader evidentiary changes beyond recovery. | Legislature intended only to cap recovery, not to change admissibility of collateral-source evidence. | Legislature did not abrogate the collateral source rule’s evidentiary aspect. |
Key Cases Cited
- Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. 2007) (codified collateral-source rule; recovery cannot be windfall)
- Black v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 478 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1972) (implied contract to pay; incurred charges possible recoveries)
- Texarkana Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Murdock, 946 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1997) (evidence of medical expenses related to injuries; related issues)
- Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000) (premiums and awards in damages contexts; procedural implications)
- Harris Cnty. v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2002) (exemplary damages; procedural considerations for caps)