Aaron Engler v. Gulf Interstate Engineering Inc
280 P.3d 599
Ariz.2012Background
- Gray, a Gulf Interstate Engineering employee, worked in Mexico on a design/construction project and commuted from Houston to Yuma, with Gulf reimbursing travel and lodging.
- Gray’s work day was defined by Gulf as starting when he left the Yuma hotel and ending when he returned there; Gulf did not supervise after-work activities.
- On the evening of December 11, 2007, after work in Mexico, Gray drove back to the hotel, ate with a coworker, and then caused a collision while returning to the hotel.
- Engler sued Gray and Gulf for injuries, asserting Gulf’s vicarious liability for Gray’s negligent driving.
- The trial court granted Gulf summary judgment; the court of appeals later adopted McCloud II’s broader scope-of-employment view for out-of-town travel, but this Court granted review to resolve the conflict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gray was acting within the scope of employment when the accident occurred | Engler: activities in Yuma served Gulf’s business. | Gulf: Gray’s after-hours conduct was independent and not controlled by Gulf. | Gray was not within the scope; Gulf not liable. |
| Whether Restatement (Third) controls the scope-of-employment analysis | Engler urges broader, compensation-like view. | Gulf: apply Restatement Third to require employer control. | Restatement Third test applied; no employer control at time of accident. |
| Whether Gulf exercised control over Gray’s after-work activities | Engler contends all Yuma activities further Gulf’s purposes. | Gulf did not control where, when, or if Gray dined after work. | No control; activities were Gray’s independent course. |
| Whether McCloud II should control disposition of this case | Engler urges McCloud II’s rule. | Gulf distinguishes McCloud II and notes regulation-like context. | declined to follow McCloud II. |
| Whether workers’ compensation principles should govern vicarious liability in this context | Engler seeks workers’ compensation guidance for scope. | Gulf urges tort-based scope analysis, not workers’ comp. | Workers’ compensation principles do not govern; tort scope applies. |
Key Cases Cited
- McCloud v. Kimbro (McCloud II), 224 Ariz. 121 (App. 2010) (out-of-town travel scope debated; does not mandate regulation here)
- Robarge v. Bechtel Power Corp., 131 Ariz. 280 (App. 1982) (control test for scope of employment; independent course ends liability)
- Rousseau, 111 Ariz. 130 (1974) (basic control test for torts arising from vehicular accidents)
- Ketcham, 49 Ariz. 295 (1937) (restatement-based factors for control in scope analysis)
- Higgins v. Assmann Elec., Inc., 217 Ariz. 289 (App. 2007) (cites Restatement (Second) § 229 factors for scope)
- Carnes v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 227 Ariz. 32 (App. 2011) (assessing scope at time of tortious act; control analysis)