Aaron Carter v. L. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132

Background

Aaron Carter, a Virginia inmate and adherent of the Nation of Islam, participated in a prison "Common Fare" program that provided religiously appropriate meals in exchange for compliance with program rules.
On Nov. 26, 2015, Carter accepted a regular main-line Thanksgiving tray rather than a Common Fare tray and was suspended from the program for one year.
Carter previously grieved the suspension, arguing the Common Fare agreement had been breached when the prison changed the menu (Oct. 1, 2015) to include items—e.g., fried foods—he said violated his religious dietary rules; grievance relief was denied.
He sued pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Exercise Clause) and RLUIPA seeking declaratory, injunctive, and damages relief; the district court granted summary judgment to defendants.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding Carter’s complaint (liberally construed) challenged both the menu change and the suspension, that he had standing and his claims were not moot, and that summary judgment for defendants was improper because defendants failed to identify penological or compelling interests supporting the challenged burdens.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Carter's complaint includes a challenge to his suspension as well as the menu change	Carter argued the menu change voided the Common Fare agreement, so the suspension was unlawful and both matters were challenged	Defendants argued the complaint did not encompass the suspension, so Carter lacked standing to seek prospective relief about the menu	Court held the complaint (liberally construed) did challenge both the menu and the suspension; both are before the court
Standing to seek prospective relief about Common Fare menu after suspension	Carter said he retained standing because he sought to overturn the suspension, which could allow redress for the menu injury	Defendants said suspension at filing eliminated standing to challenge menu content	Court held Carter had standing: overturning suspension could redress his injury and suspension was time-limited, so prospects for relief were sufficient
Mootness of claims for prospective relief given suspension expiry and prisoner transfer	Carter argued expiration and transfer did not moot his claim because reinstatement is not automatic and a judgment could require rescission or reinstatement that would have effect at his new facility	Defendants argued suspension expiry and transfer mooted prospective relief	Court held claims were not moot: expiration does not guarantee reinstatement and VDOC policy could permit reinstatement at new facility; meaningful redress remained possible
Whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Free Exercise and RLUIPA merits	Carter asserted he created genuine disputes that (a) his Nation of Islam prohibits fried foods, (b) the menu imposed a substantial burden	Defendants raised for first time on appeal that Carter had not proven fried foods are prohibited or that remaining menu items were nutritionally adequate to avoid a substantial burden; they offered no penological or compelling justification in district court	Court held summary judgment improper: verified complaint, affidavit, and doctrinal excerpt create genuine dispute about fried-food prohibition and defendants failed to present any asserted governmental interest to justify the burden under Turner or RLUIPA

Key Cases Cited

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (prison regulations must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests)
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (threshold for Free Exercise: sincere belief and substantial burden)
Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (RLUIPA requires compelling interest and least restrictive means)
Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174 (do not evaluate significance of particular belief; government must present justification relied on below)
T–Mobile Ne. LLC v. City Council of Newport News, 674 F.3d 380 (standard of review on summary judgment)
Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820 (verified complaint can operate as opposing affidavit for summary judgment purposes)