Aaron Basham v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
455 S.W.3d 415
| Ky. | 2014Background
- Aaron Basham, a convicted sex offender, lived temporarily with a former coworker and family; he babysat the coworker’s children in 2007–2008.
- Years later the coworker’s then-eight-year-old daughter, "Sally," reported sexual abuse by Basham; she described vaginal intercourse and other contact.
- Sally underwent a forensic interview and later testified at trial at age 12; physical exam was normal.
- Basham was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and first-degree persistent felony offender; sentenced to life with parole/probation barred for 25 years.
- On appeal Basham challenged (1) exclusion of evidence that Sally had previously been exposed to pornographic websites and (2) the trial court’s striking of a prospective juror for cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of evidence that the child had seen pornographic websites | Commonwealth: evidence is prior sexual behavior or predisposition and subject to KRE 412; defense failed to comply with KRE 412(c) notice | Basham: exposure is an alternative source of knowledge (rebuts the sexual innocence inference), not "sexual behavior," so KRE 412 does not apply | Exclusion affirmed — defense offer failed to show the websites contained depictions of the specific sexual acts alleged, so evidence lacked probative value and was properly excluded |
| Constitutional right to present a defense (due process/compulsory process) arising from that exclusion | Basham: exclusion violated Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present a defense and confront witnesses | Commonwealth: evidence would not be probative; defendant has no right to present nonprobative evidence or to conduct a fishing expedition | Denied — constitutional claim fails because the excluded evidence was not probative of the asserted alternative source of knowledge |
| Striking Juror 846016 for cause | Basham: juror ultimately said she would follow the law; striking her was improper and prejudicial because it allowed an extra peremptory for the Commonwealth | Commonwealth/Trial court: juror expressed confusion and strong concerns about penalty/persistent-offender issues; impartiality was doubtful | Affirmed — trial court did not clearly abuse discretion; when juror fairness is uncertain, excusal is appropriate to preserve trial integrity |
| Prejudice from striking juror (systematic exclusion/Batson concern) | Basham: striking a juror potentially favorable to defendant prejudiced him by changing peremptory use | Commonwealth: no evidence of systematic exclusion (race), so no Batson problem; excusal preserved fairness | Affirmed — no Batson or structural-prejudice issue; excusal was within discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (constitutional limits on exclusion of defense evidence balanced against state rules of evidence)
- Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (defendant’s right to present relevant defense evidence under the Sixth Amendment)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibition on race-based exclusion of jurors)
- Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827 (Ky. 2004) (standard: trial court’s decision to excuse juror for cause reviewed for clear abuse of discretion)
- Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 762 (Ky. 2013) (when juror impartiality is doubtful, trial courts should tend toward exclusion)
- Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 28 (Ky. 2010) (discussing how victim age and cultural sexual exposure affect inference that knowledge derives from abuse)
- Grant v. Demskie, 75 F. Supp. 2d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussion of the "sexual innocence inference" and use of evidence showing alternative sources of sexual knowledge)