AAA Federal Credit Union v. Indiana Department of Transportation, 2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 289

AAA Federal Credit Union bought a 0.75-acre lot in South Bend and built a bank branch; property originally abutted U.S. Highway 31 with direct western driveway access to U.S. 31 and southern access to Dice Street.
DOT and FHWA planned and implemented a U.S. 31 improvement project (public process began in 2002); the project converted U.S. 31 into a divided, grade-separated limited-access highway and shifted it slightly west.
The Project left AAA’s parcel physically intact: both original driveways and Dice Street access remained; the western driveway now connects to Hildebrand Street (a frontage road) rather than directly to U.S. 31, requiring circuitous routes for drivers on U.S. 31.
AAA sued DOT in inverse condemnation in 2014, alleging a compensable taking from loss of direct access / reduced traffic flow from U.S. 31; trial court entered judgment for DOT after a bench trial.
The trial court found AAA purchased after the Project planning began and concluded no legal taking occurred; AAA appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a compensable taking occurred from loss of direct access to U.S. 31	AAA: loss of direct access and reduced customer traffic is a taking requiring compensation	DOT: property and access points were not physically appropriated or destroyed; only traffic patterns changed	No taking — loss of traffic from a particular roadway is not a compensable interest
Whether AAA had a property interest in the free flow of traffic from a particular road	AAA: had a property right to direct access from busy U.S. 31 and to continued abutment to that highway	DOT: property rights include ingress/egress but not a right to traffic flow from a specific public road	No — landowner has no cognizable property right in traffic flow from a particular road; only ingress/egress rights are protectable
Applicability of regulatory-takings/Penn Central analysis	AAA: reduced value supports application of Lingle/Penn Central regulatory-takings framework	DOT: this is reconfiguration of public property (not regulation of private property), and antecedent property interest is lacking; AAA also bought after planning began	Lingle/Penn Central do not rescue AAA: antecedent property interest absent and planning/public notice undermined reasonable expectation claim

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (distinguishes per se takings and regulatory takings and frames Penn Central factors)
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (establishes multi-factor test for regulatory takings)
Kimco of Evansville, Inc. v. State, 902 N.E.2d 206 (Ind. 2009) (rejects recovery for traffic-flow changes; protects ingress/egress rights)
Ensley v. State, 164 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1960) (early formulation: no property right in free flow of traffic; protect ingress/egress)
Biddle v. BAA Indianapolis, L.L.C., 860 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. 2007) (discusses takings analysis and context-specific approaches)
State v. Dunn, 888 N.E.2d 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (inverse condemnation bifurcation and application of traffic-flow/ingress-egress distinction)
Canteen Serv. Co. v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 932 N.E.2d 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (applies traffic-flow rule where road reconfiguration altered access routes)
Green River Motel Mgmt. of Dale, L.L.C. v. State, 957 N.E.2d 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (no taking where highway moved and detours were required)
State v. Geiger & Peters, Inc., 196 N.E.2d 740 (Ind. 1964) (ingress/egress taking where an access point was destroyed)
State v. Tolliver, 205 N.E.2d 672 (Ind. 1965) (ingress/egress taking where remaining access was effectively unusable)
State v. Diamond Lanes, 242 N.E.2d 632 (Ind. 1968) (took where primary access was completely eliminated)