A.W. Ex Rel. Doe v. Nebraska, 865 F.3d 1014

In 2013 A.W., an 11-year-old, was adjudicated delinquent in Minnesota for conduct constituting first-degree criminal sexual conduct and was ordered to register under Minnesota's predatory-offender statute.
A.W. moved to Nebraska in 2013 and obtained an Interstate Compact transfer of supervision; Nebraska authorities notified A.W. he must register under Nebraska's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) or face referral.
Minnesota requires registration for A.W. based on the juvenile delinquency adjudication but does not publicly disclose that juvenile registrants' identities; Nebraska's SORA generally makes registrant information public via the Nebraska State Patrol registry.
Nebraska's SORA § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) applies to a person who "enters the state and is required to register as a sex offender under the laws of another ... state." The parties agreed A.W. entered Nebraska while required to register in Minnesota; dispute centered on whether A.W. was a "sex offender."
Plaintiffs (A.W. and guardians) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; the district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, holding SORA § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) does not apply to juvenile delinquency adjudications like A.W.'s.
The State appealed; the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Nebraska law treats "sex offender" as including juvenile delinquency adjudications from other states.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) applies to a juvenile adjudicated delinquent in another state	"Sex offender" means someone convicted of a sex crime; juvenile adjudication is not a conviction and thus not covered	The phrase "under the laws of another state" incorporates the other state's definition; A.W. was required to register in Minnesota, so Nebraska may require registration	Held: "Sex offender" in § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) is read by Nebraska's plain meaning (not the other state's definition); juvenile delinquency adjudications are not convictions and do not render A.W. subject to SORA

Food Mkt. Merch., Inc. v. Scottsdale Indem. Co., 857 F.3d 783 (8th Cir.) (standard of review for summary judgment and statutory interpretation)
John T. v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 684 (8th Cir.) (predicting state supreme court interpretation of state law)
State v. Gilliam, 874 N.W.2d 48 (Neb.) (Nebraska courts give plain and ordinary meaning to statutory terms and do not import other-state definitions)
Farmers Coop. v. State, 893 N.W.2d 728 (Neb.) (court considers statute's language and purpose; ambiguity permits legislative-history inquiry)
State v. Norman, 808 N.W.2d 48 (Neb.) (interpreting SORA legislative findings and highlighting that SORA targets persons "pleaded guilty to or have been found guilty of sex offenses")
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (U.S.) (right to travel jurisprudence)
Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (U.S.) (state discrimination against newly arrived citizens implicates right to travel)
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (U.S.) (Privileges or Immunities/Equal Protection aspects of right to travel)
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 738 F.3d 885 (8th Cir.) (avoid statutory constructions that raise grave constitutional questions)