A.S. v. People
2013 CO 63
| Colo. | 2013Background
- Juvenile A.S. pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child (would be a class 4 felony as an adult) and to an aggravated juvenile offender enhancer; parties stipulated to DHS commitment of three years or less, offense-specific treatment, and sex-offender registration.
- A magistrate sentenced A.S. to two years' commitment to DHS, suspended on condition of two years' probation.
- Prosecutor sought review, arguing section 19-2-601(5)(a)(I)(A) prohibits probation for aggravated juvenile offenders; the district court reversed the magistrate, vacated the suspended sentence, and remanded.
- The court of appeals affirmed; the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether subsection (5)(a)(I)(A) allows suspension of DHS commitment with probation.
- The Supreme Court majority reversed the court of appeals, holding that subsection (5)(a)(I)(A) — which uses "may" — permits suspension of a DHS commitment and imposition of probation for aggravated juvenile offenders whose offense would not be a class 1 or 2 felony as an adult.
- Justice Boatright (joined by Justice Eid) dissented, arguing that the statutory scheme and surrounding provisions show the General Assembly intended mandatory DHS commitment (no probation) for aggravated juvenile offenders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 19-2-601(5)(a)(I)(A) allows a court to suspend a DHS commitment and impose probation for an aggravated juvenile offender whose offense is not a class 1 or 2 felony | A.S.: "may" is permissive; the court has discretion to suspend DHS commitment and place the juvenile on probation | State: "may" should be read as mandatory ("shall"); aggravated juvenile status was intended to preclude probation and require DHS commitment | The Court held "may" is permissive; subsection (A) allows suspension of commitment on condition of probation for offenses other than class 1 or 2 felonies |
Key Cases Cited
- Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2006) (statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo and court must effectuate legislative intent)
- People in the Interest of W.P., 295 P.3d 514 (Colo. 2013) (read related statutory provisions together to give consistent, harmonious effect)
- People v. Triantos, 55 P.3d 181 (Colo. 2002) ("may" typically permissive; contrast with "shall")
- People v. Dist. Court, 718 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986) (discussing ordinary meanings of "shall" and "may" in statutes)
- Danielson v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 791 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1990) (may can be construed as shall when necessary to effectuate legislative purpose)
- People v. Hoehl, 568 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1977) (construing "may" to avoid constitutional vagueness)
- Duprey v. Anderson, 518 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1974) (construing permissive language as mandatory to avoid due process problems)
- Fierro v. People, 206 P.3d 460 (Colo. 2009) (entire sentencing scheme should be construed to give harmonious effect)