A. Marchese v. PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 169 A.3d 733

In Nov. 2015 Trooper stopped Anthony Marchese for Vehicle Code violations, detected marijuana odor, found marijuana residue, and arrested him for DUI (controlled substance).
At the hospital Marchese refused a requested warrantless blood test and declined a drug recognition evaluation; Trooper Kirk issued implied-consent warnings on DOT DL-26 and reported the refusal to DOT.
DOT notified Marchese of an 18-month civil suspension under 75 Pa. C.S. §1547(b)(1)(ii) for refusal; Marchese appealed the suspension to the trial court.
Marchese invoked Birchfield v. North Dakota (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2016) and argued Pennsylvania’s Implied Consent Law is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine because it conditions driving privileges on surrendering the right to refuse a warrantless blood test.
The trial court dismissed his appeal; the Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding Birchfield bars criminal penalties for refusal but does not invalidate state civil license suspensions under Pennsylvania’s Implied Consent Law.

Issue	Marchese's Argument	DOT's Argument	Held
Whether Birchfield requires invalidation of Pennsylvania’s civil license-suspension scheme for refusing a warrantless blood test	Birchfield bars punishing refusal to a warrantless blood test and thus DMV civil suspension is unconstitutional and an unlawful condition on driving	Birchfield only precludes criminal penalties; civil suspensions are separate administrative penalties and permissible	Court held Birchfield does not invalidate Pennsylvania’s civil implied-consent suspensions; suspension affirmed
Whether Implied Consent Law violates the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine by conditioning driving on consenting to warrantless blood draws	Conditioning license on consent coerces forfeiture of Fourth Amendment rights, invoking Koontz/Camara/Frost	Driving is a privilege; conditioning licensure on compliance with safety-related regulations is reasonable and not an unconstitutional condition	Court rejected the unconstitutional-conditions claim; licensure may be conditioned on submitting to testing under the statute
Whether refusal-based civil suspensions implicate the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule	Suspension for refusal is a penalty for resisting an unlawful search and should be barred	License suspensions are civil and remedial; exclusionary rule extends to criminal prosecutions, not civil administrative penalties	Court held suspension is civil and does not trigger the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (criminal penalties for refusing warrantless blood tests are unconstitutional; court limited its holding and said it should not be read to cast doubt on civil implied-consent schemes)
Boseman v. Dep’t of Transp., 157 A.3d 10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (Commonwealth Court: Birchfield does not apply to Pennsylvania civil license suspensions)
Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1989) (license suspensions are civil/administrative proceedings)
Regula v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 146 A.3d 836 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (elements DOT must prove to sustain a refusal-based suspension; reasonable-grounds standard)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (reasonable suspicion standard in Fourth Amendment analysis)
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (U.S. 1961) (rationale for exclusionary rule aimed at deterring police misconduct in criminal prosecutions)
Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (U.S. 1998) (exclusionary rule not automatically extended to noncriminal proceedings)
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (U.S. 1983) (discusses evidentiary consequences for refusal to submit to testing)
McNeely v. Missouri, 569 U.S. 141 (U.S. 2013) (warrant requirement applies to nonconsensual blood draws absent exigent circumstances)
Plowman v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 635 A.2d 124 (Pa. 1993) (driving is a privilege, not a property right)