117 F. Supp. 3d 1220
D.N.M.2015Background
- A.M. is a 66-year-old developmental-disabled woman involuntarily committed in 1963; DOH operated Fort Stanton and Los Lunas Hospital, with Fort Stanton as a subsidiary; aftercare moved residents to private third parties from the 1970s–1980s without guardians or court oversight; A.M. was transferred from Fort Stanton to the Homestead House (private, unlicensed) on Nov. 12, 1979, and remained under DOH custody; the transfer and subsequent care allegedly failed to provide health services, protections, or court oversight; the complaint asserts seven claims including First, Fourth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and various statutory claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether A.M.’s First Amendment expressive-association claim survives qualified immunity | A.M. pled deprivation of expressive association rights | Expressive association is not shown; no protected expressive purpose alleged | Claim dismissed; no plausible expressive-association violation shown |
| Whether A.M.’s First Amendment rights to access to courts were violated | denial of access to courts and counsel found in complaint | Court-access claim not clearly established pre-1979; no prejudice shown | Not addressed here; court focused on expressive association and Fourth Amendment claims; access-to-courts claim to be resolved separately (in separate opinion) |
| Whether A.M. was unlawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment by transfer to Homestead House | Transfer without consent or due process violated Fourth Amendment | A.M. was in state custody; transfers within custody are not seizures; no clearly established right in 1979 | Dismissed; no Fourth Amendment seizure liability; qualified immunity applies |
| Whether the Fourth Amendment right not to be transferred between facilities was clearly established by 1979 | Right existed pre-1979 based on broader Fourth Amendment rights and earlier cases | No clearly established law explicitly governing transfers of civilly committed individuals in 1979 | Not clearly established; qualified immunity bars the claim |
| Whether the right to expressive association was clearly established prior to 1979 | Expressive association rights existed via Patterson and Abood line of cases | Expressive association as applied here not shown; no protected expressive-group sought | Court ultimately recognizes expressive association as clearly established pre-1979 but finds no viable expressiveness claim under First Amendment due to lack of deprivation of expressive association |
Key Cases Cited
- Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 221 (U.S. 1984) (expressive association framework; two distinct protections under First Amendment)
- City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (U.S. 1989) (limits of general social association rights; not all social encounters protected)
- Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (U.S. 2000) (expressive association in organizational context; control of message/content)
- Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognition of expressive association as implicit First Amendment protection)
- Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1993) (recognition of familial association protections under due process)