A.M. ex rel. Marshall v. Monrovia Unified School District
627 F.3d 773
9th Cir.2010Background
- A.M. has cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, developmental delays, is nonverbal, and relies on yes/no responses to communicate.
- In 2002, A.M. enrolled in California Virtual Academy (CAVA) via Kern County for independent study; a home-visiting teacher and adapted curriculum supported him.
- CAVA and Plaintiffs created an IEP in 2002; 2003-2004 meetings failed to finalize goals but placement continued as independent study/home schooling.
- On December 9, 2005, a new IEP proposed a third-grade general-education placement with supports, but CAVA could not implement it; Plaintiffs provided proof of residence and the 2005 IEP to Defendant District on December 12, 2005.
- Defendant transferred A.M. to its district; intake occurred December 20, 2005; A.M. began services January 9, 2006; February 9, 2006 IEP meeting occurred without Plaintiffs; May 1, 2006 IEP offered a special day class placement in Encinitas; OAH ruled for Defendant; A.M. died during pendency; district court granted summary judgment for IDEA and Section 504; attorney’s fees awarded to Defendant were challenged, and the case was appealed to establish final rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transfer-related thirty-day IEP requirement (56325(a)(1) and 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)). | A.M.'s last approved IEP should govern during transfer. | Only the last implemented IEP matters; 2005 IEP not implemented thus not controlling. | Court adopted OAH's interpretation that the last implemented IEP governs during the thirty-day window. |
| Procedural sufficiency of IEP meetings and parental participation. | Defendant failed to hold a proper December 20, 2005 intake as an IEP meeting and impeded participation. | Intake meeting not an IEP meeting; steps were taken to involve Plaintiffs; participation feasible via telephone. | District court properly affirmed OAH; Plaintiffs had meaningful participation and no procedural violation. |
| Substantive adequacy of the 2006 IEP and least restrictive environment. | IEP was not tailored to A.M.'s unique needs and not appropriate. | IEP was based on A.M.'s needs and provided educational benefit in a suitable LRE. | IEP was substantively adequate; placement in a special day class was appropriate and in the LRE. |
| Section 504 claim viability. | Section 504 claim persists due to failure to implement 2005 IEP and placement issues. | No discrimination since IEP was valid and implemented. | No viable Section 504 claim; implementing a valid IEP suffices for compliance. |
| Attorney fees post-mootness and waivers. | Remand unnecessary; claims for reimbursement and damages survived death. | Fees improper due to mootness; waiver of reimbursement/damages. | Remand ordered to address fee award; majority erred on waiver issue; see concurring/dissenting views. |
Key Cases Cited
- Amanda J. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (mootness and education benefits standards under IDEA)
- Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (U.S. Supreme Court 1982) (FAPE requires an appropriate IEP; deference to OAH; de novo ultimate IEP adequacy review)
- Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg by & Through Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995) (deference to OAH findings when reviewing IEP decisions)
- Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. TA, 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008) (purpose of IDEA to provide FAPE; transfer/last approved IEP considerations)
- Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (U.S. Supreme Court 1993) (mootness and reimbursement considerations under IDEA Section 504 contexts)
- Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008) (Section 504/IDEA interplay; viability of claims)