A. D. v. State of Calif. Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446

Plaintiffs are Eklund’s children, who allege Fourteenth Amendment due process violations under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against CHP Officer Markgraf for shooting Eklund after a high-speed pursuit.
The district court denied Markgraf’s renewed JMOL and found a jury could rationally conclude he acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to a legitimate objective.
At trial, the jury was instructed on the “purpose to harm” standard and found Markgraf acted with such a purpose.
The jury verdict supported damages to Plaintiffs; Markgraf’s post-trial JMOL was denied, and fees were awarded to Plaintiffs.
This court vacated earlier portions, held oral argument, and then addressed qualified immunity, the fee award, and related rulings, affirming in part and reversing/remanding in part.
On remand, the district court was instructed to consider settlement-offer evidence for fee calculations in light of intervening precedent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Markgraf entitled to qualified immunity for the shooting?	Plaintiffs show a violation of clearly established due process.	Markgraf acted under a legitimate objective or reasonable defense.	No; the right was clearly established and the jury found a prohibited purpose.
Does the jury verdict preclude an objective qualified-immunity analysis?	Jury findings on subjective motive must govern post-verdict immunity analysis.	Immunity analysis can be conducted objectively notwithstanding the verdict.	The jury’s subjective finding governs post-verdict immunity, defeating immunity.
Should the fee award be remanded to consider settlement offers?	Settlement offers reflect plaintiff’s success and should influence fees.	Pre-existing Rule 408 prevented consideration of settlement offers.	Remand to allow district court to weigh settlement offers consistent with intervening law.
Was the district court correct to exclude evidence of Eklund’s drug use and criminal history?	Such evidence is relevant to credibility and the claim.	Evidence not in issue during liability phase; exclusion appropriate.	Affirmed; evidence properly excluded.
Did the court err in denying Markgraf’s summary-judgment and recognizing the jury’s findings?	There was no genuine dispute that Markgraf acted with a prohibited purpose.	Summary judgment appropriate given immune defenses and facts.	Affirmed on the standard of review; the district court’s denial of JMOL stood.

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (established 'purpose to harm' due process standard when deliberation is impractical)
Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1998) (defined 'purpose to harm' under shocks-the-conscience analysis)
Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussed illegitimate purposes even when arrest is effected later)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective reasonableness standard; cautions against considering motive in Fourth Amendment context)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (clearly established law requires fact-specific inquiry; not general propositions)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (rejected overly general definitions of clearly established law)
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (clarified 'clearly established' requires fair warning at the time)
Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462 (1st Cir. 1994) (jury verdicts on subjective claims influence qualified immunity analysis)