A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A.
885 F.3d 1054
7th Cir.2018Background
- A.D., a minor, sued Credit One Bank under the TCPA alleging repeated autodialed calls to her cell phone placed to collect her mother’s debt.
- Ms. Serrano (A.D.’s mother) had a Credit One cardholder agreement containing an arbitration clause and class-action waiver, and Credit One’s records later showed A.D.’s phone number attached to Serrano’s account after Serrano used A.D.’s phone to access the account.
- Credit One moved to compel arbitration after discovery, arguing A.D. was an "Authorized User" (or otherwise bound) and thus subject to the arbitration clause; the district court granted the motion and stayed the case.
- The district court concluded A.D. directly benefited from the cardholder agreement and was estopped from avoiding arbitration; it certified an interlocutory appeal on whether A.D. was bound.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed: A.D. was not an authorized user under the contract terms, was a minor without capacity to contract (and had disaffirmed any such relation), and equitable estoppel/direct-benefits principles did not require arbitration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether A.D. is bound to arbitrate as an Authorized User of Serrano’s account | A.D.: she never was added as an Authorized User and did not consent to arbitrate | Credit One: A.D. used the card and thus was an Authorized User per agreement language | Held: Not bound — contract requires a formal addition process, age requirement, fee, and issuance of a card; none occurred |
| Whether equitable estoppel/direct-benefits binds A.D. to the arbitration clause | A.D.: she received no direct contractual benefit and her TCPA claim does not rely on the card agreement | Credit One: A.D. directly benefited by using the card and her claims implicate the contract (consent defense) | Held: Not estopped — A.D. received only a limited, non-contractual benefit; her TCPA claim is independent and does not rely on enforcing the card agreement |
| Whether A.D.’s minority and failure to plead infancy waived her right to avoid arbitration | A.D.: as a minor she lacked capacity and has disaffirmed any contractual obligations; she filed suit while still a minor | Credit One: A.D. waived or impliedly ratified by failing to raise infancy earlier | Held: Minority protects A.D.; Credit One had the burden to prove she was an Authorized User and could not rely on waiver here |
| Whether a defendant’s affirmative defense relying on the cardholder agreement transforms a statutorily based TCPA suit into one subject to arbitration | A.D.: TCPA claim stands apart; consent is an affirmative defense for Credit One to prove, not part of A.D.’s claim | Credit One: because consent under the card agreement is relevant, the dispute centers on the contract and should be arbitrated | Held: Rejected — reliance on the agreement as an affirmative defense does not convert the plaintiff’s independent statutory claim into one that invokes the arbitration clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) (context for TCPA’s origination addressing autodialers)
- AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (Supreme Court) (FAA reflects a national policy favoring arbitration)
- Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (Supreme Court) (arbitration is a matter of contract)
- United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court) (a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate disputes it did not agree to submit)
- Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 682 (7th Cir.) (limits on binding non-signatories; exceptions listed)
- Scheurer v. Fromm Family Foods LLC, 863 F.3d 748 (7th Cir.) (standard of review for motions to compel arbitration; equitable doctrines may apply)
- Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir.) (direct-benefits estoppel doctrine in arbitration context)
- E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.) (decision explaining when a dispute is "core" to a contract)
