A.D.P. v. Exxonmobil Research & Engineering Co.
54 A.3d 813
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.2012Background
- A.D.P., a 29-year ExxonMobil employee, was required to sign an abstinence and random testing policy as a condition of employment after voluntarily disclosing alcoholism.
- The policy and after-care contract imposed two years of random testing and three years of monitoring only on employees identified as alcoholics, not on non-alcoholic employees.
- A.D.P. had no pending disciplinary action and her job performance had not been shown to be adversely affected by alcohol.
- Between Oct 2007 and Aug 2008, A.D.P. underwent nine random breathalyzer tests, all negative; two tests in Aug 2008 yielded BAC readings of .047 and .043.
- She was terminated on Aug 26, 2008 for allegedly violating the alcohol and drug policy, despite testimony that termination would occur even if she were in the top percent of performers.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for ExxonMobil, dismissing all claims; the court later reversed/ remanded on LAD and Pierce claims per the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there direct evidence of disability discrimination | ADP's alcoholism and the policy show hostility to disabled employees. | Policy was a reasonable, safety-based program applicable to conditions of employment. | Yes; direct evidence found, shifting burden to ExxonMobil. |
| Whether Price Waterhouse replaces McDonnell Douglas in this case | Direct evidence requires Price Waterhouse analysis. | McDonnell Douglas should apply unless direct evidence exists. | Direct evidence governs; Price Waterhouse analysis applies. |
| Whether ExxonMobil's after-care policy constitutes a lawful defense under LAD | Policy targets alcoholics and is facially discriminatory. | Policy is a reasonable accommodation and safety measure. | Policy not justified as a matter of law; summary judgment improper. |
| Whether the public policy claim under Pierce should survive | Termination violated public policy due to privacy rights. | Pierce claim merits no independent relief beyond LAD. | Pierce claim properly dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- McDevitt v. Bill Good Builders, Inc., 175 N.J. 519 (N.J. 2003) (direct evidence shifts burden; employer must show but-for bias)
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1989) (mixed-m motive framework; direct evidence requires proof of discrimination)
- Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1991) (safety/handicap defenses; not all neutral policies immunize discrimination)
- Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 110 N.J. 363 (N.J. 1988) (safety and individualized assessment defenses under LAD)
- Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188 (N.J. 1999) (direct evidence concept; discrimination and proof standards)
- Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575 (N.J. 1988) (treatment of disability discrimination and procedural standards)
- Maher v. N.J. Transit Rail Ops., Inc., 125 N.J. 455 (N.J. 1991) (prima facie evidence framework for discrimination claims)
- Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81 (N.J. 1992) (public policy analysis; clear mandate requirement)
- Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (N.J. 1980) (public policy wrongful termination standard)