A. Adcock v. Telford Borough and A. Clemens, A. Adcock v. Telford Borough and A. Clemens

Alice Adcock sued Telford Borough and landowner Alice Clemens after a sidewalk/ramp slip-and-fall; Adcock settled with Clemens and signed a joint tortfeasor release.
Telford Borough moved for summary judgment asserting governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, arguing it could only be secondarily liable under the Sidewalks Exception.
Borough contended that because the primarily liable private party (Clemens) was released, all claims against a secondarily liable municipal defendant were extinguished as a matter of law.
The trial court denied Borough's summary judgment motion by order dated November 30, 2015; Borough sought certification for interlocutory appeal but the trial court failed to act (deemed denied).
Borough attempted to appeal directly to the Commonwealth Court, which first considered whether the order denying summary judgment was appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
The Commonwealth Court held that deciding Borough's immunity claim would require resolving factual and legal issues that are ingredients of the main negligence claim, so the order was not separable and collateral and the appeal was quashed as interlocutory.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court's denial of Borough's summary judgment is appealable under the collateral order doctrine	The denial involves immunity question separable from merits and is appealable as collateral	The order is separable and purely legal (release of primary tortfeasor extinguishes claims against secondarily liable Borough)	Not appealable — fails first prong (not separable/collateral)
Whether Borough was entitled to summary judgment based on governmental immunity / extinguishment after release of primary tortfeasor	Adcock argued Borough may have primary liability under the Real Property Exception (improper ramp design) and also secondary liability under Sidewalks Exception	Borough argued sidewalks excluded from Real Property Exception and, as secondarily liable, claims are extinguished by release of the primarily liable party	Not reached on the merits (interlocutory); court noted resolving immunity requires deciding issues that are ingredients of the underlying negligence claim

Bollinger by Carraghan v. Obrecht, 552 A.2d 359 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (discusses appealability and collateral order doctrine in Commonwealth Court)
Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1985) (requires all three collateral-order prongs be met)
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (U.S. 1949) (established collateral order doctrine exception to final-judgment rule)
Geniviva v. Frisk, 725 A.2d 1209 (Pa. 1999) (courts must narrowly apply collateral order doctrine)
Gwiszcz v. City of Philadelphia, 550 A.2d 880 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (sets out three-prong test for collateral order doctrine)
Bullard v. Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth., 668 A.2d 223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (standard of review for summary judgment referenced)