2019 COA 131
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Timothy West was charged with sexual assault of a child under 15, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and a class 4 drug felony; he admitted to having engaged in sex with the underage victim.
- West waived counsel and proceeded pro se at trial after repeated court advisements about the risks of self-representation; the court at times appointed advisory counsel and intervened on procedural matters.
- West repeatedly asserted speedy-trial claims based on a mailed not-guilty plea dated December 20, 2014; the trial began June 22, 2015.
- During pretrial and trial proceedings West complained of numerous discovery and evidentiary rulings (including limits on access to juvenile records, witness impeachment, and late-added counts) and argued these rulings deprived him of his right to self-representation.
- The trial court conducted in camera review of sealed juvenile records and issued protective orders; West was convicted by a jury and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Speedy trial (statutory and constitutional) | People: Trial date of June 22, 2015 fell within the applicable statutory/constitutional periods. | West: Trial more than six months after he mailed a not-guilty plea; violated speedy-trial rights. | Held: No violation — delay not presumptively prejudicial under Barker and June 22 was within the statutory six-month period if December 20 letter is counted. |
| Right to self-representation re: evidentiary/discovery rulings | People: Rulings were ordinary evidentiary/discovery decisions not implicating Faretta; errors (if any) are not unique to pro se status. | West: Multiple discovery and evidentiary rulings cumulatively deprived him of the right to represent himself. | Held: Denial of counsel is the core Faretta claim; evidentiary/discovery rulings alone do not convert to a denial of the right to self-representation. |
| Waiver of counsel at advisement hearing | People: West’s statements were equivocal; court reasonably presumes against waiver and appointed counsel. | West: Court improperly appointed public defender over his objection, denying his request to proceed pro se. | Held: Court did not err — West’s waiver was not unequivocal at advisement, so appointment was permissible until he made an unequivocal invocation. |
| Disclosure of victim’s juvenile records | People: Protective order and in camera review appropriate to protect confidential records; records not material to verdict. | West: Juvenile records contained exculpatory evidence and should have been disclosed. | Held: After independent in camera review appellate court concluded disclosure would not likely have changed verdict; no reversible error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (constitutional right to self-representation but a valid waiver of counsel must be knowing and intelligent)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor balancing test for Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claims)
- People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989) (courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a waiver of the right to counsel)
- Venalonzo v. People, 388 P.3d 868 (Colo. 2017) (limits on witness testimony that opines on another witness’s veracity; impropriety of bolstering in child sexual assault cases)
- People v. Abdu, 215 P.3d 1265 (Colo. App. 2009) (standards for evaluating Faretta invocations and trial court duties toward pro se defendants)
- People v. Sandoval-Candelaria, 321 P.3d 487 (Colo. 2014) (discussion of what constitutes a presumptively prejudicial delay for speedy-trial analysis)