98 Lords Highway, LLC v. One Hundred Lords Highway, LLC
138 Conn. App. 776
Conn. App. Ct.2012Background
- Counterclaim defendants 98 Lords Highway, LLC and Klokus appeal after a court trial that quieted title in three counterclaim plaintiffs (Gubner, Fash, DeSousa) who claimed fee simple title to portions of adjacent land; LLC sought to encroach on each plaintiff’s lot along the western boundary.
- LLC withdrew its complaint two days before trial; lis pendens were released but Gubner’s counterclaim to quiet title survived.
- Gubner claimed adverse possession of land 15 feet beyond a Meehan survey fence opening.
- Klokus acquired all LLC interests in 98 Lords Highway shortly before trial and was joined as counterclaim defendant after notice from the court.
- Court found each counterclaim plaintiff had marketable title under the Marketable Title Act and rejected Gubner’s adverse possession claim as to 15 feet, but remanded for proper open-and-notice standard.
- Issues arose whether Muller's absence deprived subject-matter due process, whether Fash/DeSousa had viable counterclaims after withdrawal, and whether the adverse possession standard was correctly applied to Gubner’s claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject matter jurisdiction without Muller | Gubner, Fash, DeSousa claim jurisdiction existed despite Muller. | Muller indispensable; lack of joinder undermines jurisdiction. | Court had subject matter jurisdiction. |
| Viability of Fash/DeSousa counterclaims after LLC withdrawal | Answers to withdrawn complaint could sustain §47-31 counterclaims. | Need separate, delineated counterclaims; jurisdiction issues. | Fash and DeSousa had viable counterclaims; liability properly analyzed. |
| Amendments after Klokus joined | Plain error to require amendments; Klokus informed and joined. | Amendments necessary to comply with 47-31(b). | No plain error requiring amendments; due process not violated. |
| Adverse possession standard applied to Gubner | Open-and-visible standard properly applied; evidence supports claim. | Court applied heightened standard requiring subjective notice. | Remanded for proper, non-heightened open-and-visible standard for adverse possession. |
Key Cases Cited
- Swenson v. Dittner, 183 Conn. 289 (1981) (nonjoinder not fatal to jurisdiction in quiet-title cases; due process concerns addressed separately)
- Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277 (2006) (nonjoinder not jurisdictional defect; due process concerns must be considered)
- Hilton v. New Haven, 233 Conn. 701 (1995) (due process and joinder principles in administrative actions)
- Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168 (2005) (restoration of withdrawn cases; functional equivalent of docket restoration)
- CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239 Conn. 375 (1996) (trial court’s actions during quagmire viewed as restoration to docket for justice)
- Lucas v. Crofoot, 95 Conn. 619 (1921) (open-and-visible possession considerations for adverse possession)
- Robinson v. Myers, 156 Conn. 510 (1968) (contrast where lack of indicia distinguished from present case; open/visible standard)