8100 NORTH FREEWAY LTD. v. City of Houston, 329 S.W.3d 858

City regulates sexually oriented businesses (SOBs) and requires permits for operation.
8100 North Freeway Ltd. operated an adult bookstore/arcade (Megaplexxx/Tryst) with booths and viewing rooms seeking a permit under the SOB ordinance.
City denied a permit citing direct line of sight and other arcade-regulation requirements; Megaplexxx/Tryst challenged compliance and later altered its business model.
Police inspected the premises; observed minors prohibition, explicit material, and arcade devices in booths; signs directing to arcade, and continuous explicit video display.
City sued for operating an adult arcade without a permit and sought injunctive relief; trial court granted a temporary injunction to close the arcade area.
On appeal, the court upheld the temporary injunction, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the primary business standard apply to article II SOB regulation?	8100: primary business must be sexual.	City: SOB categorization not limited by primary business.	No; primary business standard does not apply.
Is injunctive relief authorized for article II violations given chapter 243?	8100: no authority in article II; relies on silence.	City: chapter 243 authorizes injunctions for SOB regulations; article II cumulative.	Authorized under chapter 243; City may seek injunction.
Was the injunctive relief proper under preserving the status quo?	8100: injunction overbroad and alters status quo.	City: status quo preserved because violations ceased by injunction.	Yes; relied on status quo preservation principle.
Does the injunction amount to an unlawful prior restraint on First Amendment activity?	8100: suppresses speech by closing arcade environment.	Not a content-based restraint; focuses on compliance with ordinance.	Not an unlawful prior restraint.
Should the court address merits or constitutionality of the ordinance on appeal?	8100: seek review of ordinance's enforceability.	Review limited to abuse of discretion in issuing injunction, not merits.	No advance ruling on merits; issues involving constitutionality not reviewed at this stage.

Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) (standard for abuse of discretion in temporary injunctions)
EMS USA, Inc. v. Shary, 309 S.W.3d 653 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (temporary injunction standards; merits not reviewed)
West v. State, 212 S.W.3d 513 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006) (injunction standards; statutory authorization nuances)
Ralph Williams Gulfgate Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. State, 466 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971) (statutory injunctive relief authority)
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (U.S. 1986) (prior restraint doctrine not applicable to content-neutal licensing enforcement)
San Miguel v. City of Windcrest, 40 S.W.3d 104 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000) (temporary injunction does not resolve constitutional challenges)