477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC
477 Mass. 162
| Mass. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff (477 Harrison Ave., LLC) purchased a building to redevelop; defendants (JACE Boston, LLC and Arthur Leon), owners of the adjoining property, opposed the redevelopment through zoning/administrative submissions, appeals, a declaratory action over a party wall, insurance claims, a police report, and an application for a criminal complaint.
- Disputes spanned 2012–2015: ZBA approvals, defendant appeals to Superior Court, a declaratory judgment enforcing a 1926 indenture restricting demolition, and multiple attempts to enjoin construction.
- Plaintiff proceeded with construction in January 2014 after ISD permits and court orders allowing limited trespass to protect the defendants’ property.
- In December 2014/January 2015, Leon filed a police report and an application for a criminal complaint for alleged trespass; the criminal complaint was dismissed for lack of probable cause.
- Plaintiff sued in Superior Court asserting abuse of process and G. L. c. 93A § 11 claims; defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under the Massachusetts anti‑SLAPP statute (G. L. c. 231, §59H).
- The Superior Court denied the special motion; defendants sought direct appellate review. The SJC ruled (1) defendants met the threshold under §59H for the abuse of process claim but not for the c.93A claim, (2) only the criminal‑complaint petitioning activity lacked reasonable basis, and (3) remanded under the augmented Duracraft/Blanchard framework to allow plaintiff to try to show the suit is not a SLAPP.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether each claim is "based on" defendants' petitioning activity (threshold under anti‑SLAPP) | Plaintiff: claims arise from and are in response to defendants' petitioning, but include non‑petitioning acts | Defendants: claims are solely based on their petitioning (zoning letters, appeals, litigation, police/criminal filings) | Court: defendants met threshold for abuse of process (conduct complained of was petitioning); defendants did not meet threshold for c.93A because false insurance claims constitute non‑petitioning conduct |
| Whether alleged non‑petitioning conduct sustains abuse of process claim at threshold | Plaintiff: insurance claims and Leon's statements show ulterior motive and non‑petitioning misconduct | Defendants: those alleged acts are not the conduct forming the abuse of process claim; petitioning activity is the operative conduct | Held: insurance claims unrelated; Leon's statements reflect motive but are not separate non‑petitioning conduct—threshold met for abuse of process |
| Whether c.93A claim is subject to special motion dismissal | Plaintiff: c.93A arises from the same pattern of misconduct, including false insurance claims causing economic harm | Defendants: c.93A is based on petitioning activity and so subject to §59H dismissal | Held: c.93A claim survives special motion because allegations include non‑petitioning acts (false insurance claims) providing a substantial basis outside petitioning |
| Whether plaintiff met second‑stage burden to defeat special motion on abuse of process (legitimacy of petitioning; Blanchard augmentation) | Plaintiff: defendants' petitioning lacked any reasonable factual or legal support and caused actual injury; or alternatively, the suit was not primarily a SLAPP under Blanchard | Defendants: most petitioning had arguable legal/factual basis; only isolated act (criminal complaint) might be vulnerable | Held: plaintiff proved only the criminal‑complaint application lacked reasonable basis and caused injury; other petitioning had arguable basis; remand allowed so plaintiff may attempt to show, under Blanchard, the entire abuse‑of‑process claim was not primarily a SLAPP suit |
Key Cases Cited
- Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 Mass. 156 (establishes Massachusetts anti‑SLAPP threshold and two‑stage inquiry)
- Fustolo v. Hollander, 455 Mass. 861 (clarifies threshold showing that claims are "based on" petitioning)
- Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543 (second‑stage standard: petitioning lacks any reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law)
- Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148 (procedural standards for anti‑SLAPP special motion and use of affidavits)
- Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517 (petitioning conduct focus at threshold; motive irrelevant to threshold analysis)
- Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 456 Mass. 627 (elements of abuse of process and types of actionable misuse)
- Wenger v. Aceto, 451 Mass. 1 (petitioning activity must have some reasonable factual or legal merit)
- Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113 (motive irrelevant to whether conduct is petitioning at threshold)
- Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. (2017) (augments Duracraft by allowing nonmoving party to defeat special motion by showing claim was not primarily brought to chill petitioning)