24th Senatorial District Republican Committee v. Alcorn, 820 F.3d 624

Background

The 24th Senatorial District Republican Committee (the Committee) adopted the Party Plan designating a convention to nominate its 2015 candidate; incumbent Senator Emmett Hanger invoked Virginia’s Incumbent Protection Act and designated a primary.
The Committee sued state election officials under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, claiming the Act infringed the Party’s First Amendment right of association by preventing the Committee’s Plan-based nomination method.
Daniel Moxley (challenger) intervened, asserting an Equal Protection challenge, arguing the Act gives incumbents an electoral advantage.
The district court held the plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); plaintiffs appealed.
Central contract question: whether the Party Plan’s phrase “where permitted to do so under Virginia Law” incorporated all Virginia statutes (including unconstitutional ones) so that the Plan voluntarily limited the Committee’s authority and thus caused the alleged injury.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing—causation/redressability of Committee's First Amendment claim	Plan does not incorporate unconstitutional state law; Act causes the injury and a judicial ruling invalidating the Act would restore Committee's choice	Plan expressly conditions LDC authority “where permitted ... under Virginia Law,” so the Party voluntarily limited its authority; injury stems from Party contract choice, not state law	Committee lacks standing: Plan unambiguously limits LDC authority to the extent Virginia law provides otherwise, so alleged injury flows from Party's voluntary choice
Moxley’s individual standing (Equal Protection)	Moxley claims competitive injury from Act granting incumbent advantage; challenge to Act could redress his harm	Moxley is bound by the Plan and has no contractual or legal right to control nomination method; even if Act voided, Party could still defer to incumbent	Moxley lacks standing: no legally protected interest in selecting method and his injury is not redressable because Party could still defer to incumbent
Need for jurisdictional discovery / factual development	Committee argued Plan interpretation was contested factual matter requiring discovery before dismissal	Commonwealth argued Plan language was plain and the record sufficed; parties told the court there were no disputed facts	No discovery required: Plan interpretation is a question of law, record (the Plan) was sufficient, and parties represented no factual disputes
Contract interpretation — meaning of “Virginia Law” in the Plan	“Virginia Law” should be read as valid state law only; if Act unconstitutional, Plan does not incorporate it, so Committee retains authority	“Virginia Law” includes applicable Virginia statutes (including §24.2‑509(B)); omissions elsewhere in Plan show deliberate delegation limits	Majority: plain text and structure show the Plan delegates LDC authority only “where permitted” by Virginia law, so it incorporated the Act; therefore the Party voluntarily limited its own authority

Key Cases Cited

Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904 (4th Cir. 1997) (party’s voluntary choice can defeat causation for standing in challenges to election rules)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing: injury-in-fact requirements)
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (U.S. 2015) (ordinary meaning of “law of your state” is valid state law; courts should not read contracts to include invalid state laws)
Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2009) (two types of 12(b)(1) challenges and standards for resolving jurisdictional facts)
Blitz v. Napolitano, 700 F.3d 733 (4th Cir. 2012) (when legal question can be resolved on record, dismissal without expansive discovery may be appropriate)
Seabulk Offshore, Ltd. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 377 F.3d 408 (4th Cir. 2004) (contract interpretation is a question of law; courts give plain meaning to written instruments)