2, 838 F.3d 265

Background

On Nov. 19, 2011, NYPD conducted a "buy-and-bust"; undercover officer C0039 (UC 39) acted as the "ghost" and later reported that Kwame Garnett had acted as a lookout/manager and said words attributed to him during the sale.
Garnett was arrested based in part on UC 39’s report, held on $50,000 bail for ~8 months, and acquitted at state trial.
Garnett sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, failure to intervene, and denial of the right to a fair trial based on fabricated evidence.
At the federal jury trial, the jury found for Garnett on the fair-trial claim (nominal $1 and $20,000 punitive damages) but not on false arrest or malicious prosecution.
The district court denied UC 39’s Rule 50 motion (arguing probable cause insulated him) relying on Ricciuti, and denied Garnett’s Rule 59 motion challenging a supplemental probable-cause jury instruction.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding Ricciuti covers fabricated accounts of officers’ own observations conveyed to prosecutors and that the jury instruction was proper.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Ricciuti permits a fair-trial §1983 claim when an officer fabricates his own account of observations and gives it to prosecutors	Ricciuti applies; fabrication of any material evidence forwarded to prosecutors violates the right to a fair trial	Ricciuti limited to fabricated confessions; if arrest was supported by probable cause, fabrication cannot support an independent fair-trial claim	Held: Ricciuti applies to fabricated officer accounts; a §1983 fair-trial claim can proceed even if probable cause existed for the arrest
Whether probable cause for arrest bars a fair-trial claim premised on fabricated evidence	Probable cause does not defeat a claim based on fabrication that influenced prosecution/detention	Probable cause negates causation — arrest lawfulness forecloses fair-trial liability	Held: Probable cause is not a defense; fabrication that is likely to influence prosecutors/jury can cause a separate deprivation of liberty
Whether the district court erred in denying UC 39’s JMOL (Rule 50) on causation element of fair-trial claim	JMOL warranted because any detention resulted from a privileged arrest, not the alleged fabrication	JMOL denied — evidence could support fabrication that influenced prosecution and liberty deprivation	Held: Denial of JMOL affirmed; viewing evidence in plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could find fabrication and causation
Whether the supplemental jury instruction on probable cause (given in response to jury question) was legally inadequate and warranted a new trial	Court should have told jurors "mere knowledge" without involvement is not probable cause	Court’s instruction (totality of circumstances, reasonable officer viewpoint) was sufficient; defense objected to overbroad direction	Held: Denial of new trial affirmed; supplemental instruction was accurate, covered the issue, and did not abuse discretion

Key Cases Cited

Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1997) (fabrication and forwarding of false information to prosecutors violates the accused’s right to a fair trial)
Morse v. Fusto, 804 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2015) (cites Ricciuti for clearly established right against fabrication-caused liberty deprivation)
Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000) (recognizes fabrication of evidence can produce deprivation of liberty redressable under §1983)
Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2003) (articulates elements of a fair-trial claim based on fabricated evidence)
Cole v. Carson, 802 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizes a due-process right not to be framed by police fabrication and endorses similar analysis)