15-04 329, 15-04 329

Veteran served 2007–2011; filed claim for service-connected migraine headaches (received by VA May 10, 2011).
Attorney (appellant) and Veteran executed a statutory fee agreement in April 2012; attorney perfected appeals seeking higher rating.
December 2013 RO increased migraine rating from 0% to 30% effective May 10, 2011; VA implemented payment in February 2014.
Because the Veteran was receiving military retired pay and the combined VA rating was <50% at that time, VA withheld VA compensation (to avoid duplicative payment).
January 2014 RO denied direct VA payment of attorney fees tied to the December 2013 award because no cash past-due VA benefits were paid to the Veteran; later RO decisions (2015) granted higher ratings and a fee, but the Board limited its review to entitlement tied to the December 2013 decision.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether VA must pay counsel directly from past-due benefits awarded in Dec. 2013 when no cash retroactive VA payment was made due to military retired pay	Appellant: Snyder means “award” equals gross award; §5904(d) does not require actual cash payment to veteran before attorney can be paid	VA/Board: Regulation 38 C.F.R. §14.636(h)(1)(iii) requires a cash past‑due payment from which VA can deduct fees; statutory and regulatory scheme forbids duplicate payments to retirees	Denied — no direct VA fee payment because no cash past‑due VA benefits were paid to the veteran for the Dec. 2013 award
Validity/applicability of 38 C.F.R. §14.636(h)(1)(iii) requiring cash payment before VA deducts fees	Appellant: Regulation conflicts with Snyder and exceeds VA authority	Board: Snyder is distinguishable (addressed reductions for incarceration, not duplicate-retiree withholding); Secretary permissibly restricted fee payment by regulation under §5904	Held — regulation valid and applicable; appellant did not show conflict with statute

Snyder v. Nicholson, 489 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (held attorney fee calculation should be based on amount awarded before statutory reduction for incarceration; Court’s definition of “award” is limited to the facts and statutory context of that case)